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Summary	of	the	report	
	
	
Data	on	blockholdings:	
• On	average	24.1%	of	the	shares	are	held	by	shareholders	with	a	stake	of	5%	or	more,	
and	the	average	firm	has	2.3	blockholders.	
• Over	the	period	2006-2016,	the	concentration	of	ownership	has	decreased,	from	34.6%	
to	 24.1%	 ownership	 by	 blockholders.	 This	 reduced	 concentration	 may	 affect	 the	
potential	for	long-term	oriented	shareholders	negatively.	
• In	 the	 Netherlands,	 financial	 institutions,	 including	 pension	 funds,	 are	 relatively	
unimportant	 as	 blockholders	 in	 Dutch-listed	 companies,	 while	 individuals	 are	
blockholders	with	the	largest	average	blocks	of	shares.		
• Further	 analyses	 show	 that	 46%	 of	 the	 blockholdings	 in	 2016	 have	 been	 established	
more	than	10	years	earlier.		
• There	 is	 a	 trade-off	 between	ownership	 concentration	on	 the	one	hand	and	 takeover	
defenses	and	liquidity	on	the	other	hand:	firms	with	blockholders	are	less	protected	by	
takeover	defenses	and	have	lower	liquidity.	
	
	
Survey	and	interview	outcomes:	
• The	research	is	based	on	a	survey	complemented	by	in-depth	interviews	for	a	selected	
group	of	 respondents,	which	are	different	 from	the	blockholders	 identified	 in	 the	 first	
part.	
• The	 survey	 is	 largely	 conducted	among	Dutch-based	 investors,	while	80%	of	 investors	
are	foreign	based.	Hedge	funds,	an	important	group	of	short-term	oriented	and	activist	
investors	 in	 Dutch-listed	 companies,	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	 survey.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	
selection	bias	towards	more	long-term	investors,	which	have	their	headquarters	in	the	
Netherlands.	This	may	lead	to	a	bias	towards	a	long-term	orientation	in	the	results.	
	
Long-term	value	creation	
• The	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 surveyed	 investors	 indicate	 that	 they	 have	 an	 investment	
horizon	of	at	least	two	years	and	half	of	the	investors	indicate	that	they	have	a	horizon	
of	more	than	five	years.	Pension	funds	and	insurers	find	long-term	oriented	goals	more	
important	than	investment	funds.	While	all	investor	groups	consider	financial	returns	to	
be	 important	 for	 long-term	value	creation,	pension	 funds	and	 insurers	 rank	social	and	
environmental	factors	significantly	higher	than	investment	funds.	
• Most	investors	argue	that	long-term	value	creation	can	only	be	realised	by	investing	in	
and	 engaging	 with	 companies	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 adding	 value	 over	 the	 long-term,	
thereby	having	a	positive	or	at	least	a	less	negative	effect	on	society.	Investors	want	to	
contribute	 to	 financial	 stability	 and	 add	 value	 to	 the	 real	 economy.	 A	 very	 important	
concept	here	is	“stakeholders”:	a	company	cannot	create	value	over	the	long-term	if	it	
does	not	take	into	account	the	interests	of	all	stakeholders,	versus	shareholders	only.	
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• The	survey	shows	that	all	investor	groups	are	primarily	motivated	by	their	beneficiaries	
(asset	owners	or	clients)	to	pursue	long-term	value	creation.	Another	important	motive	
is	 the	 investment	 belief	 that	 long-term	 value	 creation	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	
shareholder	returns.	Stakeholder	oriented	investors	feel	 it	 is	their	obligation	to	society	
and	invest	significant	resources	in	measuring	the	benefits	of	long-term	value	creation.	
• It	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	
(large)	diversified	portfolios.	Moreover,	a	long	investment	chain	complicates	alignment	
on	 long-term	value	creation,	while	 family	offices	with	concentrated	 investments	and	a	
long-term	 vision	 (without	 frequent	 performance	 benchmarking)	 are	 able	 to	 engage	
effectively	with	companies	on	long-term	value	creation.	
• A	key	barrier	 to	 long-term	value	creation	 is	periodic	benchmarking.	This	 is	particularly	
prevalent	 among	 investment	 funds,	 short-term	 investors	 and	 financially	 oriented	
investors.	The	fact	that	investors	follow	a	benchmark	indicates	they	are	not	consciously	
selecting	companies	 for	which	they	believe	that	they	will	add	value	over	the	 long	run.	
Also	pension	fund	mandates	for	asset	managers	are	sometimes	based	on	minimising	the	
tracking	error	with	a	 leading	benchmark,	while	pension	fund	owners	themselves	use	a	
time	weighted	return.	
• Respondents’	 indication	that	they	pursue	 long-term	value	creation	 is	 inconsistent	with	
the	 wide-spread	 practice	 of	 measuring	 performance	 against	 a	 market	 return	
benchmark.	
• Another	barrier	is	the	traditional	education	of	portfolio	managers	with	a	strong	belief	in	
markets,	 which	 can	 foster	 short-termism.	 Next,	 prudential	 supervision	 requires	 large	
institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	 requirements	
and	 financial	 risk	 management	 metrics	 and	 questions	 investors	 when	 there	 are	
deviations	from	benchmarks.	
• Fiduciary	duty	is	a	key	concept.	International	investors	indicate	that	Dutch	clients	(more	
than	clients	in	other	markets)	hold	them	accountable	on	ESG	factors.	
	
	
Engagement	
• Inadequate	corporate	governance	 is	an	 important	 trigger	 for	 shareholder	engagement	
for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 For	 investment	 funds,	 the	most	 important	 trigger	 to	 become	
active	 is	underperformance	of	a	company.	 In	contrast,	 socially	 irresponsible	corporate	
behaviour	 is	 an	 important	 trigger	 for	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 and	 stakeholder	
oriented	investors.	
• Engagement	 is	 the	 preferred	 strategy	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	Most	 investors	 indicate	
that	 (continuous)	dialogues	with	portfolio	companies	are	most	 important.	They	 rather	
engage	in	private	(behind	the	scenes)	than	in	public.	
• For	 most	 large	 funds,	 corporate	 governance	 specialists	 decide	 on	 the	 engagement	
policies,	whereas	 the	portfolio	managers	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 investment	decisions	
and	actual	engagement.	This	can	lead	to	situations	in	which	no	integrated	decisions	are	
made.	
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• All	investors	indicate	they	make	use	of	collective	engagement	(with	other	investors),	as	
they	believe	this	enables	them	to	have	a	stronger	voice.	Of	critical	importance	here	are	
regulatory	 considerations	 (e.g.	 acting	 in	 concert	 rules)	 and	 finding	 investors	 that	 are	
like-minded.	Collective	engagement	and	collaboration	only	work	if	investors	have	similar	
investment	beliefs.	All	investors	indicate	that	they	make	extensive	use	of	Eumedion	(and	
equivalent	bodies	in	other	countries)	to	communicate	with	other	investors.	
	
	
Conditions	for	long-term	value	creation	
• The	 research	 suggests	 several	 conditions	 for	 investors	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 pursue	 an	
investment	strategy	aimed	at	 long-term	value	creation.	Investors	can	realise	long-term	
investment	 returns	 by	 investing	 in	 and	 engaging	 with	 companies	 that	 are	 capable	 of	
adding	value	over	the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	positive	effect	on	the	value	of	their	
portfolios	and	on	society.	
• A	first	condition	is	an	intended	buy-and-hold	approach	with	a	typical	holding	period	of	
more	 than	 five	 years.	 This	 stimulates	 acting	 as	 a	 steward	 of	 the	 company.	 The	
blockholding	data	of	Dutch	firms	demonstrates	that	blockholders	–	with	stakes	of	5%	or	
more	–	are	long-term	shareholders.	
• A	second	condition	is	an	active	investment	strategy,	with	a	concentrated	portfolio.	This	
active	 investment	 strategy	 is	 often	 based	 on	 fundamental	 analysis	 of	 the	 invested	
companies.	 Blockholders	 have	 the	 voting	 power	 to	 influence	 firms,	 while	 reduced	
liquidity	makes	voting	with	the	feet	expensive	
• A	 third	 condition	 is	 effective	 engagement	with	 invested	 companies	 on	 the	 long-term,	
both	behind	the	scenes	by	meeting	with	companies	and	in	the	annual	general	meeting	
by	voting.	This	requires	human	resources,	expertise	and	time.		
• A	fourth	condition	is	performance	analysis	based	on	companies’	value-added	in	the	real	
economy	(both	financial	and	societal	value).	By	contrast,	a	passive	benchmark	strategy	
(with	 minimum	 tracking	 error)	 does	 not	 allow	 (large)	 deviations	 from	 the	 market	
benchmark.	 It	 is	 also	 difficult	 to	 have	 sufficient	 knowledge	 about,	 and	 really	 engage	
with,	multiple	companies	in	the	benchmark	portfolio.	
• A	fifth	condition	is	alignment	of	the	mandate	of	the	asset	owner	or	client	and	the	asset	
manager	 on	 the	 long	 term.	 The	 survey	 indicates	 that	 asset	 managers	 are	 primarily	
motivated	 by	 their	 beneficiaries	 (asset	 owners	 or	 clients)	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	
creation.	 Another	 important	 motive	 is	 the	 investment	 belief	 that	 long-term	 value	
creation	has	a	positive	impact	on	shareholder	returns.	
• A	sixth	condition	is	to	keep	the	investment	chain	(between	parties	and	within	parties)	as	
short	 as	 possible,	 as	 each	 player	 in	 the	 investment	 chain	 may	 hold	 the	 next	 player	
accountable	to	a	shorter	period.	
• The	 development	 of	 Dutch	 firms	 where	 ownership	 concentration	 is	 reduced	 -	 as	
reported	in	the	data	on	blockholdings	-	thus	affects	the	potential	for	long-term	oriented	
shareholders	 negatively.	 Simultaneously,	 shareholdings	 in	 Dutch	 corporations	 are	
increasingly	 held	 by	 foreign	 institutional	 investors	 with	 relatively	 small	 stakes,	 which	
also	limits	the	potential	for	shareholder	engagement	with	a	long-term	horizon.	
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Recommendations:		
1. The	data	on	block	holdings	of	Dutch	firms	may	be	incomplete.	The	data	quality	can	be	
improved	by	periodic	updates	of	shareholdings	by	blockholders.	
2. Because	the	concentration	of	blockholdings	in	Dutch	firms	shows	a	negative	correlation	
with	 take-over	defenses,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	 the	debate	 about	 the	
protection	of	exchange-listed	firms	against	hostile	takeovers	that	these	protections	are	
most	relevant	for	firms	with	fewer	blockholders.	
3. To	pursue	 long-term	value	creation,	 it	 is	 important	 that	asset	owners,	asset	managers	
and	 companies	 are	 aligned	 on	 a	 long-term	mandate,	 which	 includes	 ESG	 factors	 and	
allows	 asset	 managers	 to	 take	 larger	 stakes	 and	 thus	 deviate	 from	 market-based	
benchmarks.	
4. Investors	should	work	alongside	other	stakeholders,	as	companies	can	only	create	value	
over	the	long-term	if	they	take	into	account	the	interests	of	all	stakeholders.	
5. Investors	 should	 have	 sufficient	 human	 resources	 and	 expertise	 to	 engage	 with	
companies	on	the	long-term.	Long-term	investors	could	be	incentivised	through	loyalty	
shares,	which	provide	an	additional	reward	to	shareholders	if	they	have	held	on	to	their	
shares	during	a	so-called	loyalty	period	(three,	five	or	ten	years).	
6. New	 investment	 approaches	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 (young)	
finance	professionals	on	new	 investment	beliefs,	which	 includes	ESG-factors	and	 long-
term	thinking.	
7. The	prudential	supervisor	should	avoid	encouraging	institutional	investors	to	follow	the	
market	benchmark	and	allow	active	long-term	portfolio	strategies.	
8. Institutional	 investors	 should	 promote	 internal	 cooperation	 between	 the	 governance	
teams	and	the	portfolio	managers	and	ensure	a	single	voice	on	engagement.	
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Chapter	1:	Research	questions	
	
1.1 Introduction	
Large	shareholders	in	corporations	are	normally	long-term	shareholders	and	committed	to	their	
role	 as	 stakeholder	with	 strategic	 interests	 in	 the	 firm.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 large	 shareholders	
have	the	voting	power	in	shareholders’	meeting	to	affect	voting	outcomes.	On	the	other	hand,	
large	 shareholders	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 long-term	 performance	 of	 corporations,	 because	
under	 normal	 conditions,	 they	 can	 only	 sell	 their	 block	 of	 shares	 at	 a	 discount.	 Thus,	 in	
corporations,	the	board	and	large	shareholders	face	a	long-term	mutual	dependency.		
The	 Dutch	 Corporate	 Governance	 Code	Monitoring	 Committee	 has	 emphasised	 in	 the	 most	
revision	of	the	Dutch	Corporate	Governance	Code	the	importance	of	long-term	value	creation	
by	corporations	(Monitoring	Commissie	Corporate	Governance	Code,	2016).	For	such	a	longer	
horizon	the	role	of	shareholders	–	and	in	particular	large	shareholders	–	is	an	important	issue,	
as	 financiers	 and	 owners	 of	 the	 firm’s	 share	 capital,	 as	 well	 as	 engagement	 partners	 in	 the	
shareholder	meetings.	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 report	 is	 to	 document	 the	 presence	 and	 dynamics	 of	 large	
shareholders	 in	 exchange-listed	 Dutch	 corporations	 and	 to	 identify	 the	 motives	 and	 voting	
behaviour	of	large	investors.	
	
1.2 Research	questions	
The	research	question	is	threefold.	For	Dutch	exchange-listed	corporations,	we:	
1. Identify	the	dynamics	of	ownership	by	large	shareholders.	
2. Identify	the	motives	of	current	large	shareholders.	
3. Identify	 recent	 voting	 behaviour	 at	 annual	 shareholder	 meetings,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
ownership	structure	of	the	corporation.	
	
1.3 Set-up	of	the	study	
We	 first	 conduct	 a	 quantitative	 study	 on	 the	 type	 of	 shareholders	 and	 percentage	 of	
shareholdings.	Using	 the	public	 register	of	AFM,	 the	 large	 shareholders	 (defined	as	holding	5	
percent	or	more	of	the	shares)	of	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies	are	identified.	The	types	of	
large	shareholders	and	the	size	of	their	shareholdings	are	specified	from	2008	to	2016,	building	
on	 the	 earlier	 study	 on	 shareholders	 from	 1992	 to	 2007	 by	 Van	 der	 Elst,	 De	 Jong	 and	
Raaijmakers	 (2007).	 The	 sums	 of	 the	 large	 shareholdings	 are	 identified	 using	 the	 disclosures	
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with	 the	 AFM.	 The	 remaining	 free	 float	 and	 trading	 of	 the	 shares	 is	 also	 calculated,	 as	 the	
fraction	of	shares	not	held	by	blockholders.1	
Following	 the	 revealed	 preference	 theory,	 we	 first	 investigate	 the	 preferences	 of	 large	
shareholders	 by	 examining	 their	 trading	 activity.	 A	 shareholder’s	 trading	 activity	 will	 be	
measured	as	the	changes	in	the	shareholder’s	total	holding	in	companies.	
Next,	the	types	of	shareholders	and	their	motives	to	hold	large	shareholdings	are	investigated.	
Why	are	they	a	large	shareholder?	Do	they	care	about	long-term	value	creation?	How	can	we	
see	 that	 large	 shareholders	 care	about	 long-term	value	creation?	What	are	 the	dilemmas	 for	
shareholders?	
The	latter	questions	are	investigated	using	a	survey	among	a	selected	set	of	large	shareholders	
and	 selected	 interviews	 (in	 particular	 institutional	 investors).	 The	 Monitoring	 Committee,	
Eumedion	and	DUFAS	have	assisted	in	approaching	large	shareholders.	
Finally,	 we	 investigate	 shareholder	 voting	 behaviour	 at	 a	 selection	 of	 annual	 shareholder	
meetings.	 The	 voting	 behaviour	 will	 be	 analysed	 for	 relevant	 agenda	 items.	 Where	 data	 is	
available,	we	will	also	investigate	the	arguments	used	by	the	different	types	of	shareholders	to	
underpin	 their	 voting.	 The	 research	 will	 extend	 the	 earlier	 work	 by	 De	 Jong,	 Mertens,	 Van	
Oosterhout	and	Vletter-van	Dort	(2007)	and	Bier,	Frentrop,	Lückerath-Rovers	and	Melis	(2012).	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
1	 Alternative	 definitions	 of	 free	 float	 include	 corrections	 for	 shares	 held	 by	 specific	 non-blockholding	
shareholders	 such	 as	 institutional	 investors.	 We	 cannot	 make	 these	 corrections,	 because	 this	
information	is	not	publicly	available.	
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Chapter	2:	Large	shareholders	of	Dutch	firms:	identification,	dynamics	
and	characteristics	
	
2.1 Introduction	
This	 chapter	 describes	 the	 ownership	 structures	 of	 Dutch	 firms	 in	 terms	 of	 blockholdings	 by	
shareholders	with	a	stake	of	5%	or	above.	We	discuss	the	2016	ownership	structures	as	well	as	
dynamics	in	ownership	using	a	longer	sample	period.	
This	description	is	relevant	for	the	understanding	of	the	role	of	large	shareholders.	However,	a	
large	part	of	the	equity	capital	of	Dutch	firms	is	held	by	non-blockholders	and	a	large	portion	of	
these	shareholders	are	foreigner	(foreign	firms	and	institutions).	Over	2007,	FESE	has	reported	
that	71%	of	 the	 shares	of	Dutch	 firms	are	held	by	 foreign	 investors.2	Eumedion	has	 reported	
that	 the	25	 firms	 in	 the	AEX	 index	were	 in	2010	for	76%	owned	by	 foreign	 institutions,	while	
this	percentage	was	37%	in	1995.3	
	
2.2 Data		
Ownership	data.	Ownership	data	 is	based	on	 the	 yearly	overview	of	disclosed	block	holdings	
from	 1992	 onwards	 published	 by	 Het	 Financieele	 Dagblad	 and	 the	 public	 database	 Wet	
Financieel	 Toezicht	 (WFT)	 Register	 of	 the	 Dutch	 Authority	 Financial	 Markets	 (AFM).	
Shareholders	in	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies	are	required	to	report	their	holdings	as	soon	
as	their	ownership	stake	crosses,	in	either	direction,	one	of	the	thresholds	of	3%,	5%,	10%,	15%,	
20%,	25%,	30%,	40%,	50%,	60%,	75%	and	95%.	Shareholders	with	ownership	stakes	below	the	
threshold	of	3%	are	thus	not	registered.	In	this	report,	only	those	shareholders	with	an	interest	
of	 at	 least	 5%	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 blockholders.	 This	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 international	
common	practice	of	5%	serving	as	the	threshold	for	substantial	shareholdings	and	to	facilitate	a	
comparison	over	a	longer	time	period.	
Liquidity	data.	In	order	to	compute	the	liquidity	data	for	all	Dutch	listed	companies,	the	number	
of	 shares	 outstanding	 and	 weekly	 trading	 volumes	 have	 been	 collected	 from	DATASTREAM.	
Additionally,	 the	 market	 values	 for	 all	 companies	 have	 been	 retrieved.	 For	 companies	 with	
cross-listings,	 the	 values	 from	 the	 stock	exchange	where	most	of	 the	 company’s	 shares	have	
been	 traded	 has	 been	 selected.	 Liquidity	 has	 been	 computed	 by	 dividing	 the	weekly	 trading	
volume	 by	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 outstanding	 in	 the	 respective	weeks.	 Naturally,	 due	 to	 the	
substantial	 shareholdings	 of	 blockholders,	 the	 companies	 with	 the	 most	 blockholders	 are	
expected	to	exhibit	the	lowest	levels	of	liquidity.		
																																								 																				
2	See	FESE	(2008).	
3	See	Eumedion	(2014).	
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Takeover	 defenses.	 The	 data	 on	 takeover	 defenses	 present	 in	 Dutch	 corporates	 has	 been	
collected	 from	 the	 Gids	 bij	 de	 Officiële	 Prijscourant,	 the	 Effectengids	 and	 the	 periodical	
overview	 provided	 by	 Eumedion.	 The	 defenses	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	 consist	 of	 Protective	
Preference	Shares,	Priority	 Shares,	 and	 	Certificates.	 The	most	 common	 takeover	defenses	 in	
2016	were	protective	preferred	shares.	This	defence	mechanism	is	defined	as	the	existence	of	a	
foundation	 affiliated	 with	 the	 company	 that	 owns	 call	 options	 on	 preferred	 shares	 in	 the	
company	 that	would	dilute	 the	ownership	of	 the	 existing	 shareholders	 by	 at	 least	 50%	upon	
exercising	 the	 option.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 foundations,	 or	 Stichtingen,	 is	 to	 ensure	 the	
continuity	of	the	company’s	operations	in	accordance	with	the	Rhineland	stakeholder-model.	In	
the	absence	of	blockholders	that	own	substantial	stakes	 in	companies,	takeover	defenses	can	
be	 used	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 shield	 the	 companies	 from	 unwanted	 takeovers.	 They	 are	 thus	
expected	to	be	a	substitute	for	blockholders.		
Data	 Limitations.	The	 year-end	ownership	 levels	 are	 derived	 from	 shareholders’	 notifications	
that	are	filed	throughout	the	year	and	come	with	a	set	of	limitations.		
Firstly,	shareholders	need	not	report	a	change	in	ownership	if	the	change	does	not	cross	one	of	
the	 thresholds	 established	 by	 the	 AFM.	 Therefore,	 the	 established	 year-end	 holdings	 are	 in	
many	 cases	 an	 approximation	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 two	 thresholds	 rather	 than	 an	 exact	
measure	of	ownership.	However,	this	approximation	is	reasonable	for	three	main	reasons:		
1. Deviations	 from	 the	 reported	 levels	 are	 fairly	 small	 due	 to	 the	 large	 count	 of	 the	
thresholds	requiring	reporting;	
2. Deviations	are	expected	to	be	random	and	to	equal	zero	on	average;	
3. Multiple	shareholders	have	been	found	to	report	changes	in	their	ownership	levels	even	
without	crossing	a	boundary	and	thus	without	being	legally	required	to	do	so.	
Secondly,	in	case	a	shareholder	does	not	report	a	change	in	ownership,	this	will	affect	the	data	
for	 a	 longer	 period,	 because	 the	 cross-section	 is	 based	 on	 accumulated	 notifications,	 not	 on	
periodic	 reporting.	 In	 particular,	 a	 single	 unreported	 divestment	 by	 a	 shareholder	 has	 a	
substantial	impact	on	the	ownership	stake	captured	by	the	analysis.	Since	ownership	levels	are	
derived	 from	reported	changes	 in	ownership,	a	blockholder	 that	divests	without	 reporting	 its	
divestment	 will	 persist	 as	 a	 blockholder	 in	 perpetuity.	 This	 results	 in	 a	 systematic	 risk	 of	
overstated	 ownership.	 In	 order	 to	 mitigate	 this	 risk,	 the	 ownership	 levels	 resulting	 from	
transaction	data	have	been	cross-checked	using	various	 sources	and	databases,	 including	 the	
companies’	annual	reports	as	well	as	the	ORBIS	database.	We	include	stakes	in	case	one	of	the	
sources	mentions	the	shareholding.	
	Thirdly,	the	year-end	holdings	are	a	measurement	at	a	single	point	in	time	and	do	not	capture	
significant	 events	 that	 might	 occur	 during	 a	 particular	 year.	 This	 limitation	 is	 particularly	
notable	 when	 evaluating	 the	 long-term	 orientation	 of	 institutional	 investors	 since	 investors	
with	a	short-term	horizon	might	not	be	captured	by	this	measure.	For	instance,	an	investor	that	
builds	up	a	substantial	stake	from	February	through	September	and	sells	its	stake	by	December	
	 11	
will	 not	be	 captured	as	 a	blockholder,	 even	 though	 it	might	have	a	 significant	 impact	on	 the	
company	and	its	decision-making	process.	
	
2.3 Dynamics	of	ownership	
For	2016	we	collect	data	for	125	firms.	These	firms	are	mainly	firms	incorporated	under	Dutch	
law,	with	 their	main	 listing	at	 the	Euronext	Amsterdam	exchange,	but	 the	set	also	 includes	a	
small	set	of	non-Dutch	firms	with	ownership	reporting	requirements	because	their	shares	are	
traded	 at	 the	 Euronext	Amsterdam	exchange.	We	 include	 all	 blockholdings	 of	 5%	 and	 above	
and	 remove	 blockholdings	 related	 to	 takeover	 defenses.	 Table	 2.1	 presents	 the	 ownership	
information	for	2016.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	descriptive	statistics	are	over	the	full	sample	
of	exchange-listed	firms	and	not	weighted	by	market	capitalisation.	
	
Table	2.1:	Ownership	in	2016	
		 Mean	 StDev	 Min	 Median	 Max	
Blockholders	 24.1	 24.1	 0.0	 16.0	 88.7	
Free	float	 75.9	 24.1	 11.3	 84.0	 100.0	
Number	of	blockholders	 2.3	 2.2	 0	 2	 9	
Pension	funds	 0.6	 2.3	 0.0	 0.0	 13.3	
Venture	capitalists	 2.5	 9.7	 0.0	 0.0	 65.8	
Banks	 1.6	 4.8	 0.0	 0.0	 32.6	
Insurance	companies	 1.4	 4.1	 0.0	 0.0	 21.7	
Other	financials	 8.9	 13.9	 0.0	 0.0	 76.2	
Non-financial	firm	 2.6	 11.2	 0.0	 0.0	 71.2	
Persons	 6.0	 14.2	 0.0	 0.0	 80.8	
Government	 0.2	 1.8	 0.0	 0.0	 19.3	
Other/undefined	 0.3	 1.4	 0.0	 0.0	 10.1	
	
In	the	set	of	firms,	on	average	24.1%	of	the	shares	are	held	by	shareholders	with	a	stake	of	over	
5%,	 which	 implies	 that	 the	 free	 float	 is	 75.9%.	 The	 variation	 is	 large,	 because	 our	 sample	
includes	firms	without	blockholders	and	firms	that	are	almost	completely	held	by	blockholders.	
Please	note	that	we	are	more	likely	to	overestimate	blockholdings.		
The	average	(median)	firm	has	2.3	(2)	blockholders,	with	a	standard	deviation	of	2.2.		
The	 financial	 institutions	 (pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 banks)	 are	 relatively	
unimportant	as	blockholders	 in	 the	Netherlands.	The	average	blockholding	 is	as	 low	as	0.6%,	
which	 is	 consistent	 with	 an	 investment	 strategy	 where	 pension	 funds	 aim	 to	 hold	 a	 well-
diversified	portfolio,	for	example	similar	to	major	indices.	The	venture	capitalists	are	important,	
but	these	often	invest	in	smaller	firms.		
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The	group	of	blockholders	with	the	 largest	average	block	are	so-called	other	financials.	These	
most	likely	include	investment	vehicles	of	 individual	 investors.	The	next	largest	is	persons,	 i.e.	
individual	shareholders.		
In	 the	 Netherlands	 non-financial	 firms	 are	 not	 important	 shareholders	 (2.6%	 on	 average),	
because	cross-holdings	are	not	widespread,	compared	to	for	example	Italy	or	France.		
In	 Table	 2.2	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 average	 ownership	 over	 2006-2016	 is	 shown.	 The	
blockholdings	have	decreased	over	the	eleven	years,	from	34.6%	to	24.1%.	In	the	composition	
of	 the	 ownership	 structure	 we	 also	 find	 that	 in	 most	 categories	 the	 blockholdings	 have	
decreased.	The	venture	capitalists	are	an	exception,	although	their	stakes	are	relatively	small.	
	
Table	2.2:	Ownership	in	2006-2016	
		 2016	 2015	 2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	 2010	 2009	 2008	 2007	 2006	
Blockholders	(aggregate)	 24.1	 26.2	 28.4	 29.5	 28.8	 29.5	 31.8	 35.1	 35.6	 34.6	 34.6	
Free	float	 75.9	 73.8	 71.6	 70.5	 71.2	 70.5	 68.2	 64.9	 64.4	 65.4	 65.4	
Number	of	blockholders	 2.3	 2.6	 2.9	 3.1	 3.0	 3.1	 3.3	 3.3	 3.5	 3.4	 3.3	
Pension	funds	 0.6	 0.4	 0.7	 0.5	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4	 0.9	 0.8	 0.8	
Venture	capitalists	 2.5	 1.9	 1.3	 1.0	 0.6	 0.7	 0.6	 0.9	 1.0	 1.1	 1.2	
Banks	 1.6	 2.2	 2.7	 2.4	 2.6	 2.5	 3.0	 3.0	 3.4	 3.6	 3.9	
Insurance	companies	 1.4	 1.8	 2.3	 2.6	 2.7	 2.8	 2.7	 2.7	 3.0	 2.4	 2.4	
Other	financials	 8.9	 10.0	 9.9	 10.7	 10.5	 10.6	 11.9	 13.9	 14.1	 13.7	 12.4	
Non-financial	firms	 2.6	 2.3	 2.6	 3.4	 3.1	 3.3	 3.1	 3.0	 3.0	 2.9	 3.9	
Persons	 6.0	 6.9	 8.1	 8.0	 7.5	 7.8	 8.6	 9.4	 8.8	 8.7	 9.0	
Government	 0.2	 0.1	 0.3	 0.3	 0.5	 0.3	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	
Other/undefined	 0.3	 0.7	 0.6	 0.7	 1.1	 1.1	 1.3	 1.4	 1.3	 1.2	 0.9	
Blockholders	(aggregate)	 24.1	 26.2	 28.4	 29.5	 28.8	 29.5	 31.8	 35.1	 35.6	 34.6	 34.6	
Observations	 125	 129	 123	 119	 117	 117	 119	 118	 118	 122	 121	
	
As	mentioned	before	we	do	not	include	stakes	below	the	5%	threshold.	However,	from	July	1,	
2013	the	lowest	notification	threshold	has	been	changed	from	5%	to	3%	and	shareholders	were	
required	 to	disclose	any	stake	between	3%	and	5%	before	 July	29,	2013.	Of	course,	our	data	
already	 includes	stakes	below	5%	for	shareholders	that	disclosed	a	change	in	ownership	from	
above	to	below	to	5%	threshold.	For	example	in	2011	and	2012	we	have	found	respectively	12	
and	15	reported	stakes	below	5%.	From	2013	onwards	this	number	increases	rapidly:	47	(2013),	
72	(2014),	80	(2015),	and	102	(2016).	The	average	ownership	percentage	of	these	positions	has	
also	decreased	from	4.6%	and	4.7%	in	2011	and	2012	to	4.0%	(2013)	to	3.7%	(2014,	2015	and	
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2016).	These	results	indicate	that	the	lowering	of	the	threshold	has	resulted	in	a	better	view	on	
the	shareholdings	of	Dutch	firms.4	
So,	who	are	the	owners	of	multiple	blocks	in	Dutch	firms?	Table	2.3	lists	all	blockholders	with	
five	or	more	blockholdings	in	2016.	
	
Table	2.3:	Blockholders	in	2016	
Shareholder	
	
Number	
of	stakes	
Average	size	
stake	(in	%)	
Smoorenburg/Navitas	B.V.	 12	 5.5	
Delta	Lloyd	N.V.	 9	 8.6	
ASR	Nederland	N.V.	 9	 6.0	
Darlin	N.V.	 6	 6.5	
Todlin	N.V.	 6	 6.1	
NN	Group	N.V.	 5	 10.7	
Decico	B.V.	 5	 5.9	
Value8	N.V.	 5	 40.7	
	
The	 insurance	 companies	 are	 frequently	 seen	 as	 blockholders.	 However,	 their	 stakes	 are	
relatively	small.	For	example,	Delta	Lloyd	has	9	blocks,	with	an	average	size	of	8.6%.	
Next,	we	investigate	how	many	years	the	blockholders	have	been	owning	a	stake	of	at	least	5%,	
in	2016.	In	total	we	have	303	blockholdings	and	we	trace	each	blockholding	back	to	2006	when	
possible.	Figure	2.1	shows	the	results.	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
4	 The	 shareholders	 with	 stakes	 between	 3%	 and	 5%	 include	 a	 number	 of	 US	 investors	 with	 several	
positions	 in	 Dutch	 firms,	 such	 as	 Dimensional	 Fund	 Advisors	 LP,	 State	 Street	 Corporation	 and	 The	
Vanguard	Group.	
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Figure	2.1:	Holding	periods	in	2016	
	
	
After	 one	 year	 (2015),	 87%	 of	 the	 blockholdings	 are	 still	 found.	 In	 46%	 of	 the	 2016	
blockholdings	 we	 are	 able	 to	 trace	 the	 firm-shareholder	 relation	 back	 to	 2006,	 i.e.	 after	 10	
years.	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 an	 underestimation,	 because	 some	 firms	 are	 not	 present	 in	 our	
database	 over	 the	 entire	 11	 years,	 blockholders	 may	 change	 names,	 and	 positions	 may	 be	
reported	late.		
	
2.4 Triangle:	ownership,	liquidity	and	one-share-one-vote	deviations	
Ownership	structures	cannot	be	studied	 in	 isolation	and	two	obvious	characteristics	that	may	
relate	to	ownership	concentration	and	identity	are	liquidity	and	one-share-one-vote	deviations,	
i.e.	 in	 the	 Dutch	 setting	 (anti-)takeover	 defenses.	 Table	 2.4	 compares	 concentration	 and	
takeover	defenses.	
	
Table	2.4:	Ownership	and	protection	in	2016	
Sum blockholdings Priority shares Certificates Preferred shares 
Below 25% 25% 0% 79% 
26-50% 
 
16% 19% 46% 
Above 50% 13% 13% 35% 
Note:	The	cells	indicate	the	percentage	of	firms	with	a	defense	measure	versus	sum	of	blockholdings.	
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Priority	shares	are	mostly	found	in	firms	with	fewer	blockholdings:	25%	in	the	below	25%	group	
and	only	13%	 in	 the	above	50%	group.	Firms	with	priority	 shares	have	46%	blockholdings	on	
average,	compared	to	51%	of	the	firms	without	priority	shares.	For	certificates	the	result	is	not	
very	clear,	probably	because	 few	firms	are	still	using	certificates.	Preferred	shares	as	an	anti-
takeover	 device	 are	more	 (79%)	 used	 by	 firms	with	 fewer	 blockholdings,	when	 compared	 to	
majority	 blockowned	 firms	 (35%).	 This	 table	 presents	 evidence	 of	 a	 trade-off	 between	 large	
shareholders	and	takeover	defenses.	
Finally,	we	investigate	the	relation	between	blockholders	and	liquidity.	For	the	years	2014-2016	
we	 collect	 from	 Datastream	 the	 share	 turnover,	 compared	 with	 the	 number	 of	 shares	
outstanding.	In	total	we	obtain	information	for	252	firm-year	observations.	In	Figure	2.2	we	plot	
the	liquidity	and	the	sum	of	blockholdings.	
	
Figure	2.2:	Liquidity	and	blockholdings	in	2014-2016	
	
	
The	results	in	Figure	2.2	indicate	a	negative	relation.	The	correlation	is	-0.13.	The	figure	shows	
that	the	observations	with	high	blockholdings	(above	65%)	have	relatively	low	liquidity.	
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Chapter	3:	Motives	and	activities	of	large	shareholders	
	
3.1 Introduction	
This	 chapter	 investigates	 the	 types	 of	 large	 shareholders	 and	 their	 motives	 to	 hold	 large	
shareholdings.	 The	 research	 focuses	 on	 the	 long-term	orientation	 of	 large	 investors.	What	 is	
their	 investment	horizon	and	do	 they	care	about	 long-term	value	creation?	The	behaviour	of	
large	 shareholder	 is	 also	 investigated.	Do	 they	engage	with	 companies	or	do	 they	exit,	when	
financial	and	non-financial	performance	issues	emerge?	
For	our	empirical	research,	we	followed	a	two-step	approach.	The	first	step	is	based	on	a	survey	
among	the	large	shareholders	in	Dutch	listed	companies.	To	gain	more	insight	in	the	motives	of	
large	 shareholders	 and	 their	 views	on	 long-term	value	 creation,	 the	 survey	 is	 complemented	
with	face-to-face	interviews	with	a	selection	of	key	shareholders.		
	
3.2 Survey	and	characteristics	of	respondents	
The	 survey	 is	 conducted	 among	 a	 selected	 set	 of	 large	 shareholders	 (in	 particular	 Dutch	
institutional	 investors)	 of	Dutch	 companies.	 The	 survey	design	and	questions	build	on	earlier	
surveys	among	large	shareholders	by	De	Jong,	Mertens,	Van	Oosterhout	and	Vletter-van	Dort	
(2007),	Barton	and	Wiseman	(2014)	and	McCahery,	Sautner	and	Starks	(2016)	to	ensure	proper	
formulation	and	comparability.	Survey	questions	are	provided	in	Appendix	1.	The	survey	covers	
the	 following	 elements:	 investor	 and	 investment	 characteristics,	 investment	 assessment	 and	
investor	engagement.	The	Monitoring	Committee	has	provided	feedback	on	the	survey.		
Because	 the	 survey	 is	 conducted	 from	a	portfolio	 investment	perspective,	 it	 invites	 the	Chief	
Investment	 Officer	 or	 another	 Board	 Member	 to	 complete	 the	 survey	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	
company).	 The	 institutional	 investors	 are	 contacted	 via	 Eumedion	 and	 the	 Dutch	 Fund	 and	
Asset	Management	Association	(DUFAS),	whose	members	cover	over	95	percent	of	the	assets	
under	 management	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 Our	 sample	 includes	 financial	 investors	 and	 the	
government,	 but	misses	 the	 category	 of	 persons	 (see	 Tables	 2.1	 and	 2.2).	 26	 responses	 are	
received	 from	116	 invitations	 that	have	been	 sent	 via	 e-mail,	which	 gives	 a	 response	 rate	of	
22.4%.	 This	 response	 rate	 can	 be	 considered	 reasonable	 compared	 to	 similar	 shareholder	
surveys,	 for	 example	 4.3%	 in	 McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016)	 and	 4.6%	 in	 De	 Jong,	
Mertens,	Van	Oosterhout	and	Vletter-van	Dort	(2007).	Although	the	number	of	respondents	is	
not	 high,	 the	 targeted	 approach	 that	 is	 used	 to	 contact	 participants	 has	 resulted	 in	 an	
acceptable	 response	 rate.	 The	 limited	 number	 of	 respondents	 reflects	 the	 size	 and	
concentration	of	the	Dutch	asset	management	market.	
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Respondent	characteristics	
Table	3.1	provides	the	respondent	characteristics	of	the	26	respondents	that	have	completed	
the	 survey.	 Panel	 A	 shows	 the	 investor	 characteristics.	 Considering	 the	 job	 titles	 of	
respondents,	 it	 can	 be	 safely	 assumed	 that	 the	 people	 completing	 the	 survey	 are	
knowledgeable	 about	 their	 firm’s	 investment	 policies,	 motives	 and	 actions	 as	 large	
shareholders.	A	large	part	of	the	respondents	are	Chief	Investment	Officers	(15%)	and	portfolio	
managers	(35%)	with	primary	responsibility	for	the	firm’s	investment	policy.	This	is	relevant,	as	
the	study	 is	 conducted	 from	a	portfolio	 investment	perspective.	Furthermore,	at	 least	half	of	
the	respondents	are	Chief	Investment	Officers	(15%)	or	Board	members	(35%),	indicating	they	
are	senior	within	their	organisation.	
Of	the	types	of	large	shareholders	that	are	represented	in	the	survey,	the	majority	are	pension	
funds	(31%).	If	the	asset	managers	of	pension	funds	are	added	to	this	category,	they	represent	
the	majority	of	the	respondents	(58%).	Pension	fund	owners	and	asset	managers	are	separately	
included	in	the	survey,	because	delegated	investment	management	can	cause	agency	problems	
between	 the	 asset	 owner	 and	 the	 delegated	 asset	 manager.	 Investment	 objectives,	 risk	
appetite,	 horizons	 and	 knowledge	 are	 typically	 not	 fully	 aligned,	 neither	 across	 nor	 within	
organisations	(Schoenmaker,	2017).	The	low	response	rate	of	hedge	funds	was	to	be	expected,	
as	this	type	of	investor	is	known	to	be	secretive	and	therefore	less	willing	to	cooperate	in	such	a	
study.	Mutual/investment	funds	are	27%	of	the	sample,	and	 insurance	companies	are	a	small	
number	representing	11%.	Table	3.2	shows	that	pension	funds	are	slightly	overrepresented	in	
the	survey,	while	insurance	companies	are	under-represented	in	the	survey.		
As	our	survey	is	primarily	targeted	at	Dutch	investors,	Dutch	funds	are	over-represented	(92%),	
with	 only	 one	 respondent	 from	 the	 United	 States	 and	 one	 from	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	
Nevertheless	-	on	average	-	only	21%	of	the	portfolio	of	the	participating	investors	is	invested	in	
the	 Netherlands.	 The	 limited	 scope	 and	 timeframe	 of	 this	 study	 did	 not	 allow	 an	 extensive	
survey	 among	 foreign	 investors	 in	Dutch	 listed	 companies.	 The	 over-presentation	 of	 pension	
funds	and	under-presentation	of	foreign	investors	(including	hedge	funds)	leads	to	a	selection	
bias,	which	affects	the	results.	As	pension	funds	tend	be	more	long-term	oriented	(reported	in	
our	 results	below),	 the	 survey	 results	may	 reveal	 longer	 time	horizons	 than	a	 survey	with	all	
types	of	 investors	proportionally	 represented.	McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016)	 also	 find	
that	 pension	 funds	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 their	 study,	 arguing	 that	 this	 type	 of	 investors	 is	
more	publicly	oriented	and	is	thus	more	inclined	to	fill	in	surveys	on	this	particular	topic,	while	
hedge	funds	are	under-represented	in	their	study	at	4%.	The	selection	bias	may	also	affect	the	
engagement	 results,	 as	 hedge	 funds,	 which	 are	 not	 participating	 in	 our	 survey,	 are	 activist	
investors,	also	in	the	Netherlands	(Becht,	Franks,	Grant	and	Wagner,	2017).	
The	respondents	 include	very	 large	 investors;	35%	of	 the	sample	 (9	respondents)	have	assets	
under	management	 of	more	 than	 €100	 billion.	 According	 to	 the	Dutch	 asset	manager	 tables	
(IPE,	2017),	only	7	Dutch	institutions	have	total	group	assets	under	management	of	more	than	
€100	billion	in	2016.	The	fact	that	these	investors	are	represented	is	important	for	the	analysis,	
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as	 they	are	 likely	 to	have	 the	motives	and	capabilities	 to	engage	with	companies	and	pursue	
long-term	value	creation.	But	the	importance	of	the	smaller	family	offices,	which	are	included	
under	investment	funds	in	our	survey,	should	not	be	underestimated.	When	it	comes	to	long-
term	value	creation	and	impact	investing,	family	offices	play	a	unique	and	important	role	due	to	
their	desire	to	align	family	values	with	investment	decisions	and	the	autonomy	with	which	they	
can	make	capital	allocation	decisions	(World	Economic	Forum,	2014).	
Panel	B	of	Table	3.1	 reports	 the	 investor	characteristics.	50%	of	 the	 respondents	have	a	very	
long	holding	period	of	more	than	five	years	and	35%	have	a	long	holding	period	of	more	than	
two	years.	 The	 combined	number	 indicates	 that	85%	of	 respondents	have	a	 long	 investment	
horizon.	 In	 an	 international	 survey	 of	 investors	 based	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Europe,	
McCahery	et	al	(2016)	find	that	71%	have	a	long	holding	period	of	more	than	two	years.	Dutch	
investors	are	thus	found	to	be	more	long-term	oriented	than	their	international	counterparts,	
which	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 stakeholder-oriented	 corporate	 governance	 model	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	The	 investor	horizon	 is	 relevant	as	 long-term	oriented	 investors	are	expected	to	
engage	more	in	long-term	value	creation	and	pursue	shareholder	activities	more	actively.		
Next,	respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	how	important	they	deem	stock	liquidity.	Only	12%	
of	the	respondents	 indicate	that	 it	 is	very	 important,	while	85%	indicates	that	their	 fund	only	
deems	 it	 slightly	/	moderately	 important.	Again	 liquidity	 is	 less	 important	 in	 the	Netherlands.	
McCahery	 et	 al	 (2016)	 find	 that	 35%	 of	 their	 respondents	 deem	 it	 very	 important	 and	 53%	
consider	it	somewhat	important.	Furthermore,	the	respondents	in	our	survey	indicate	that	–	on	
average	 -	 65%	 of	 their	 investments	 is	 invested	 actively	 versus	 passively.	 Larger	 fractions	 of	
investments	are	invested	under	a	concentrated	strategy	and	fundamental	analysis,	rather	than	
under	a	diversified	portfolio	approach.	
Lastly,	 the	 average	 period	 over	 which	 performance	 reviews	 are	 performed	 is	 18	 months.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 result	 is	 quite	 dispersed	 and	 responses	 range	 from	1	month	 (27%)	 and	12	
months	(23%)	to	120	months	(4%).	The	period	over	which	performance	reviews	are	conducted	
can	be	an	 important	 indicator	of	 long-term	 (or	 conversely	 short-term)	orientation,	as	 shorter	
periods	give	rise	to	‘quarterly	capitalism’	(Barton	and	Wiseman,	2014).		
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Table	3.1:	Characteristics	of	respondents	
	
Panel A: Investor Characteristics      
   Job-title respondent Observations Percentage 
Chief Investment Officer 4 15 
Board Member 9 35 
Portfolio Manager 9 35 
Corporate Governance or Proxy Voting Specialist 4 15 
Total  26 100 
   Type of Shareholder Observations Percentage 
Pension Fund 8 31 
Pension Fund - Asset Manager 7 27 
Mutual / Investment Fund 7 27 
Bank 0 0 
Hedge Fund 0 0 
Insurance Company 3 11 
Other Financial Institution 1 4 
Total  26 100 
   Assets Under Management Observations Percentage 
Less than €100 million 0 0 
Between €100 million and €1 billion 3 12 
Between  €1 billion and €40 billion 11 42 
Between  €40 billion and €100 billion 3 12 
Between  €100 billion and €400 billion 6 23 
More than €400 billion 3 12 
Total  26 100 
   Country of Headquarters Observations Percentage 
The Netherlands 24 92 
United States 1 4 
United Kingdom  1 4 
Total  26 100 
   Invested in the Netherlands Mean Median 
Fraction of portfolio (in percent) 20.8 4 
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Panel B: Investment Characteristics     
   Holding period of Investments (Horizon) Observations Percentage 
Very short (less than 1 week) 1 4 
Short (less than 6 months) 0 0 
Medium (6 to 12 months) 3 12 
Long (more than 2 years) 9 35 
Very long (more than 5 years) 13 50 
Total  26 100 
   Importance of Stock Liquidity Observations Percentage 
Not at all important 1 4 
Slightly important 9 35 
Moderately important 13 50 
Very important  3 12 
Extremely important 0 0 
Total  26 100 
   Investment strategy Mean Median 
Active 65 78 
Active concentrated 25 10 
Active diversified portfolio 16 0 
Active fundamental analysis  24 5 
Passive  35 23 
Actively monitored 27 20 
Not actively monitored 8 0 
   Period of Perfomance Reviews  Mean Median 
Number of months  18 12 
Note:	The	percentages	add	vertically	up	to	100%.		
	
Table	3.2:	Division	of	investor	types	in	the	Netherlands	(2015)	
Investor type Total assets (in € billion) Fraction of total assets 
Fraction of survey 
responses 
Insurance Companies € 477 19% 11% 
Investment Funds € 762 31% 31% 
Pension Funds € 1,249 50% 58% 
Source:	Financial	Corporations,	Statistical	Data	Warehouse,	European	Central	Bank.		
Note:	 This	 table	 shows	 how	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	 three	 major	 investor	 types	 are	 divided	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	Column	3	shows	the	fraction	of	total	assets	(sum	of	the	three	reported	 investor	groups).	
Column	4	shows	the	fraction	of	survey	responses	for	each	investor	type.	
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3.3 	Survey	outcomes	
The	 survey	 covers	 investment	 assessment	 (including	 long-term	 value	 creation)	 and	 investor	
engagement	(including	voice	and	exit	channels).	The	small	sample	size	and	even	smaller	groups	
for	each	investor	type	place	constraints	on	the	analysis	that	can	be	performed	on	the	collected	
data.	In	order	to	make	a	meaningful	distinction	in	the	results,	the	respondents	are	clustered	in	
different	ways.	 In	 the	 first	 categorisation,	pension	 funds	and	 insurance	 companies	 are	put	 in	
one	group	(hereinafter	‘PFIs’)	and	all	other	blockholders	are	put	in	another	group	(hereinafter	
‘Other	 blockholders’	 or	 ‘OBs’).	 Pension	 funds	 and	 insurance	 companies	 are	 put	 together,	
because	 these	 types	 of	 investors	 have	 long-term	 obligations	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 considerably	
more	prudential	oversight	than	investment	funds.		
This	 initial	 categorisation	 is	 supplemented	with	 two	other	methods	 in	which	 the	 respondents	
are	clustered	into	two	groups.	The	first	method	distinguishes	investors	with	a	(more)	long-term	
horizon	 from	 investors	 with	 a	 more	 short-term	 horizon.	 The	 categorisation	 is	 based	 on	 the	
responses	that	investors	have	provided	on	questions	6	(holding	period),	8	(ideal	horizon)	and	12	
(period	over	which	performance	 reviews	are	 conducted)	of	 the	 survey.	 The	median	 score	on	
these	questions	 is	 calculated:	 investors	who	 score	below	 the	median	are	 in	 the	 “short-term”	
group	 (ST)	and	 investors	whose	score	 is	above	 the	median	are	 in	 the	“long-term”	group	 (LT).	
The	second	method	distinguishes	investors	who	are	more	financially	oriented	versus	investors	
who	are	more	stakeholder	oriented.	This	categorisation	is	based	on	the	responses	to	the	seven	
items	 in	question	13,	which	asks	respondents	to	 indicate	how	important	various	goals	are	for	
their	 fund.	 Items	 1	 (making	 strong	 financial	 returns)	 and	 3	 (outperforming	 benchmarks)	 are	
indicative	of	a	financial	orientation.	The	score	on	these	financial	 items	relative	to	the	average	
score	 on	 all	 items	 is	 calculated	 for	 each	 respondent.	 Investors	who	 score	 above	 the	median	
score	 are	 categorised	 as	 “financially	 oriented”	 (FIN),	whereas	 investors	who	 score	 below	 the	
median	are	categorised	as	“stakeholder	oriented”	(STH).	
	
Long-term	value	creation	
The	first	set	of	questions	revolves	around	investment	assessment	and	long-term	value	creation.	
To	 question	 25a,	 “does	 your	 institution	 care	 about	 long-term	 value	 creation”,	 100%	 of	 the	
respondents	answered	yes.	Nevertheless,	the	definition	of	long-term	value	creation	may	differ	
per	 respondent	 and	 some	 investors	may	 have	 answered	 this	 question	 in	 a	 politically	 correct	
manner.	 When	 asked	 about	 their	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	 creation	 (question	 17),	 all	
respondents	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 healthy	 financial	 returns	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 cost	 of	
capital,	while	some	also	emphasise	the	goal	to	contribute	to	economic	stability	and	sustainable	
economic	growth.		
Next,	the	“pressure	to	perform	in	the	short	term	(less	than	two	years)”	is	investigated.	Table	3.3	
shows	no	major	 differences	between	 the	 groups.	 The	mean	hovers	 around	3,	 indicating	 that	
investors	 feel	 on	 average	 slightly	 pressurised	 to	 perform	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 On	 “tolerance	
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towards	 temporary	 uncertainty”,	 other	 blockholders	 and	 long-term	 investors	 are	 somewhat	
more	tolerant.	The	sources	of	pressure	are	the	asset	owners	and	beneficiaries	of	the	fund.	This	
suggests	 that	 the	 mandate	 given	 by	 the	 owner	 or	 the	 investment	 objective	 of	 the	 fund	 is	
leading	for	the	asset	manager.	
	
Table	3.3:	Pressure	to	perform	in	short-term	
 PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Pressure to perform in short-term 
(< 2 y) 3.1 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.9 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Not at all pressured  11 25 15 15 15 15 
Neither pressured nor unpressured  17 13 23 8 15 15 
Slightly pressured 28 25 0 54 15 38 
Pressured 44 38 62 23 54 31 
Extremely pressured 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Mean Mean Mean 
Tolerance towards temporary 
uncertainty  3.4 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.5 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Very intolerant 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Somewhat intolerant 11 13 15 8 15 8 
Neither tolerant nor intolerant 44 25 46 31 31 46 
Somewhat tolerant 39 25 23 46 38 31 
Very tolerant 6 38 15 15 15 15 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Source of Pressure             
Board of directors 17 20 25 11 22 13 
Asset owners 25 60 38 33 44 25 
Beneficiaries of the fund 33 0 0 44 11 38 
Regulators 8 0 0 11 11 0 
Others 17 20 38 0 11 25 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
Note:	No	significantly	different	means	between	the	two	groups.	The	percentages	add	vertically	up	to	
100%.		
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To	 learn	 about	 performance	metrics,	 an	 open-ended	 question	 (11)	 is	 used.	 Responses	 differ	
among	investors	but	(international)	benchmarks	and	relative	returns	(relative	to	a	benchmark)	
are	 widely	 employed.	 Some	 pension	 fund	 asset	 owners	 indicate	 they	 use	 time-weighted	
returns.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 performance	 of	 pension	 fund	 asset	 managers	 is	 measured	
against	a	benchmark	using	metrics	such	as	tracking	error.	This	 implies	an	 inconsistency	 in	the	
chain	from	asset	owner	to	asset	managers	and	is	likely	to	give	rise	to	principal-agent	frictions.	
Moreover,	 several	 respondents	 include	 ESG	 risks	 in	 their	 performance	 measurement.	 Some	
investment	 funds	 and	 insurers	 use	 absolute	 return	 or	 total	 shareholder	 return.	 A	 venture	
capital	fund	indicates	to	look	at	revenue	and	EBITDA	growth.	
In	 order	 to	 gain	 further	 insights	 in	 long-term	 value	 orientation,	 respondents	 are	 asked	 to	
indicate	 how	 important	 several	 goals	 are	 for	 their	 fund.	 Table	 3.4	 presents	 the	 survey	
outcomes,	 together	 with	 a	 statistical	 test	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 mean	 score	 of	 groups	 are	
significantly	 different5.	 The	 highest	 goal	 scoring	 for	 all	 groups	 is	 “making	 strong	 financial	
returns”.	This	makes	sense,	as	all	respondents	work	for	financial	institutions	and	their	primary	
goal	 is	generating	 returns	 for	beneficiaries	by	 investing	 their	money.	All	 groups	 regard	“good	
governance”	as	an	 important	goal.	 It	 is	notable	 that	other	blockholders,	 short-term	 investors	
and	 financially	 oriented	 investors	 rate	 “outperforming	 benchmarks”	 as	 significantly	 more	
important	 than	the	pension	 funds	and	 insurers,	 long-term	 investors	and	stakeholder	oriented	
investors.	 This	 could	 be	 a	 sign	 these	 investor	 groups	 are	 less	 long-term	 oriented	 and	 could	
cautiously	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	the	fact	that	“benchmark	thinking”	is	more	prevalent	
within	 these	 groups	 of	 investors.	 Next,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 as	 well	 as	 stakeholder	
oriented	investors	rate	social	and	environmental	impact	as	significantly	more	important.	
On	the	composite	scales	for	long-term	and	short-term	goals,	again	pension	funds	and	insurers	
and	 stakeholder	 oriented	 investors	 show	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 long-term	 value	 creation,	
which	 is	 statistically	 different	 from	 the	 respective	 counterparts	 (i.e.	 other	 blockholders	 and	
financially	oriented	investors).	There	is	surprisingly	no	difference	between	short-term	and	long-
term	investors.	
	 	
																																								 																				
5	A	Wilcoxon	signed-rank	test	is	used,	which	is	a	non-parametric	test	and	is	chosen	over	a	simple	t-test	
because	the	data	is	not	normally	distributed.	
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Table	3.4:	Importance	of	long-term	value	creation	goals		
  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Importance of goals              
1. Making strong financial returns 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.9* 4.5* 
2. Environmental impact 3.9** 3.1** 3.7 3.7 3.2*** 4.2*** 
3. Outperforming benchmarks 3.4* 4.3* 3.9 3.4 4.4*** 2.9*** 
4. Social (e.g. human rights) 4.1* 3.3* 3.8 3.8 3.4** 4.2** 
5. Play a stewardship role  3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1** 4.0** 
6. Employee interests 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.5 
7. Good governance 4.1 3.9 4.2* 3.8* 3.9 4.2 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Mean Mean Mean 
Composite scales             
Long-term value creation goals 
(max = 20) 15.5* 13.4* 14.9 14.8 13.7** 16.0** 
Short-term oriented goals 
(max = 10) 8.0** 9.1** 8.7 7.9 9.2*** 7.4*** 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Does your fund reject ESG risks             
Yes 89.0 87.5 100.0* 76.9* 84.6 92.3 
No 11.0 12.5 0.0 23.1 15.4 7.7 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
Note:	*	significantly	different	score	between	the	two	groups	at	10%	level,	**	at	5%	level,	***	at	1%	level.	
The	percentages	add	vertically	up	to	100%.	
	
The	motives	for	investors	to	engage	in	long-term	value	creation	differ.	Table	3.5	shows	that	all	
investor	 groups	 are	 motivated	 by	 their	 primary	 beneficiaries	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	
creation.	Pension	funds	and	insurers	“base	their	decisions	on	a	thorough	cost-benefit	analysis”	
and	are	“inspired	by	their	professional	networks”.	Stakeholder	oriented	investors	“feel	it	is	their	
obligation	 to	society”	and	“invest	 significant	 resources	 in	measuring	 the	benefits	of	 long-term	
value	 creation”.	 	 Interestingly,	 this	 investor	 group	 also	 “pursue	 long-term	 value	 creation	 as	
insurance	against	uncertainty”.	Finally,	all	investor	groups	“know	that	long-term	value	creation	
has	a	positive	impact	on	shareholder	returns”.	
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Table	3.5:	Motives	of	large	shareholders		
  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 Mean Mean Mean 
Motives to engage in LTVC             
(1) Decisions are based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis 4.1** 3.1** 3.6 3.9 3.5 4.1 
(2) We know that LTVC has a postive impact with shareholder returns 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 
(3) Our activieties to pursue LTVC are influenced by other institutional investors 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.6 
(4) Our primary beneficiaries want us to pursue LTVC 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.3 
(5) We invest significant resources in measuring the benefits of LTVC 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.8* 3.5* 
(6) The new Corporate Governance code or NGOs prompt us to pursue LTVC 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 
(7) Pursuing LTVC is our insurance against uncertainty  3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6** 3.9** 
(8) We assume but have no proof that LTVC has a postive impact on sh. returns 3.0 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.0 
(9) We feel pressure from our stakeholders to pursue LTVC 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.5 
(10) We feel it is our obligation to society to pursue LTVC 4.0 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.4* 4.2* 
(11) Professional networks inspire us to pursue LTVC 3.3* 2.4* 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Total observations 17 7 11 13 12 12 
Note:	*	significantly	different	score	between	the	two	groups	at	10%	level,	**	at	5%	level.	2	respondents	
did	not	answer	this	question.	
	
	
Shareholder	engagement	
The	second	set	of	questions	concern	shareholder	engagement.	Starting	with	the	characteristics	
of	targeted	companies,	Table	3.6	shows	the	results.	For	pension	funds	and	insurers,	the	most	
important	company	characteristic	is	when	that	company	is	experiencing	corporate	governance	
issues.	This	is	in	line	with	the	findings	from	de	Jong,	Mertens,	Van	Oosterhout	and	Vletter-van	
Dort	(2007).	For	the	other	blockholders,	the	most	important	characteristic	to	become	active	is	
an	underperforming	company.	Next,	stakeholder	oriented	investors	target	companies	more	for	
engagement	 “when	 the	 level	 of	 insider	 ownership	 in	 the	 target	 is	 higher”.	 An	 important	
characteristic	for	all	investor	groups	is	the	size	of	“our	investment	in	the	target	is	relatively	large	
to	our	total	investments”,	which	is	understandable.	
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Table	3.6:	Characteristics	targeted	companies		
  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 Mean Mean Mean 
We tend to become more active…             
…with companies that are experiencing corporate governance issues 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3 
…when we hold a larger % of total outstanding voting rights of the target 3.3 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.2 
…when we know that other investors are also active in the target company 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.1 
…when the level of insider ownership in the target is higher 2.7 2.9 2.4** 3.1** 2.8 2.8 
…when the level of institutional ownership in the target is higher 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
…when our investment in the target is relatively large to our total investments 3.4 3.9 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 
…on the shares of companies we know well 3.2 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 
…on the shares of companies with whom we do not have close business ties 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.9 2.5 2.7 
…with companies that are underperforming 3.6* 4.4* 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
Note:	*	significantly	different	score	between	the	two	groups	at	10%	level,	**	at	5%	level.	
	
Respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	their	top	four	triggers	for	shareholder	engagement.	Table	
3.7	 indicates	 again	 that	 “inadequate	 corporate	 governance”	 emerges	 as	 the	most	 important	
trigger	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 This	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	 of	McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	
Starks	(2016).	The	other	triggers	differ	across	the	groups.	“Corporate	fraud”	and	“management	
compensation”	are	important	triggers	for	pension	funds	and	insurers	and	stakeholder-oriented	
investors.	 For	 other	 blockholders,	 “poor	 corporate	 strategy”	 is	 an	 important	 trigger.	 Finally,	
“Socially	 irresponsible	corporate	behaviour	(e.g.	pollution)”	 is	an	important	trigger	for	pension	
funds	 and	 insurers,	 long-term	 and	 stakeholder	 oriented	 investors,	 indicating	 that	 these	
investors	groups	rate	social	and	environmental	factors	more	than	their	respective	counterpart	
groups.	
So,	 Table	 3.6	 is	 about	 the	 selection	 of	 companies	 that	 are	 targeted	 and	 Table	 3.7	 about	 the	
triggers	 for	 engagement.	 There	 is	 some	 overlap,	 for	 example	 in	 the	 case	 of	 companies	with	
corporate	governance	issues	or	underperformance.		
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Table	3.7:	Triggers	for	shareholder	engagement		
  PFIs OBs ST LT FIN STH 
		 % of top 4 % of top 4 % of top 4 
Triggers for Shareholder Engagement       
Poor absolute financial performance 11 38 15 23 31 8 
Poor corporate strategy 28 63 31 46 46 31 
Excessive management compensation 67 0 54 38 31 62 
Earnings restatement 17 0 23 0 0 23 
Large negative earnings surprise 11 0 0 15 8 8 
Low payments to shareholders despite high cash holdings 6 0 0 8 8 0 
Inadequate corporate governance 83 63 69 85 77 77 
Uncooperative management 0 25 8 8 8 8 
Poor financial performance relative to peers 28 38 31 31 38 23 
Large equity issuance 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large diversifying merger or acquisition 17 38 15 31 15 31 
Suboptimal capital structure 6 38 23 8 23 8 
The threat of major shareholders to sell shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporate fraud 56 13 46 38 31** 54** 
Socially "irresponsible" corporate behaviour (e.g. pollution) 67 25 46 62 38 69 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
Note:	Respondents	indicate	their	top	four	triggers	for	shareholder	engagement.	*	significantly	different	
score	between	the	two	groups	at	10%	level,	**	at	5%	level.		
	
Moving	to	the	preferred	strategy,	Table	3.8	reports	the	various	strategies.	As	many	respondents	
indicate	 they	 use	 a	 combination	 of	 strategies,	 we	 construct	 a	 composite	 variable	 for	
engagement	 (based	 on	 a	 full	 weight	 on	 the	 engagement	 variable	 and	 a	 half	 weight	 on	 the	
combined	variable).	It	appears	that	engagement	is	by	far	the	preferred	strategy	for	all	investor	
groups,	 with	 a	 slightly	 higher	 score	 for	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers,	 long-term	 investors	 and	
stakeholder	 oriented	 investors.	 These	 latter	 groups	 have	 a	 slight	 preference	 for	 “inclusion”,	
while	 their	 counterparts	 (investment	 funds,	 short-term	 investors	 and	 financial	 oriented	
investors)	have	a	 slight	preference	 for	a	“best	 in	class	approach”.	About	half	of	 the	 investors	
belief	that	the	threat	of	exit	is	effective.		
Most	 investors	 belief	 that	 a	minimum	 stake	 in	 the	 company	of	 2%	 is	 needed	 to	 be	 effective	
(bottom	panel	of	Table	3.8).	That	is	line	with	a	recent	report	on	the	investment	strategy	of	the	
Norwegian	Government	Pension	Fund	 (Kapoor,	2017).	 The	Norwegian	Fund	 follows	a	passive	
benchmark	strategy	with	a	maximum	allowable	tracking	error	of	1%,	investing	in	close	to	9,000	
companies.	 Kapoor	 (2017)	 observes	 that	 the	 Norwegian	 Fund	 does	 not	 know	 enough	 about	
what	the	companies	it	invests	in	get	up	to.	Moreover,	the	average	stake	is	1.3%	of	companies	
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worldwide.	Kapoor	 (2017)	concludes	 that	 the	Norwegian	Fund	 lacks	 the	capacity	 (in	 terms	of	
expertise	and	minimum	stake)	to	engage	actively	and	change	practice.	
	
Table	3.8:	Preferred	strategy		
  PFIs OBS ST LT FIN STH 
		 % % % 
Preferred Strategy              
Exclusion 11 0 8 8 8 8 
Inclusion  6 0 0 8 0 8 
Engagement 44 50 31 62 46 46 
Confrontation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Best-in-class approach 0 13 0 8 8 0 
Combination of the above strategies 39 25 54 15 31 38 
None of the above  0 13 8 0 8 0 
              
Composite engagement 64 63 58 69 62 65 
              
Threat of Exit Effective             
Yes 50 38 54 38 38 54 
No 50 63 46 62 62 46 
              
Minimum stake size to be effective             
Doesn't matter 44 0 68 0 25 43 
At least 0.5% 11 0 0 20 0 14 
At least 2% 33 100 17 80 75 29 
At least 5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
At least 10% 11 0 17 0 0 14 
		             
Total observations 18 8 13 13 13 13 
Note:	Composite	engagement	=	engagement	+	0.5	x	combination	of	above	strategies.	The	percentages	
add	vertically	up	to	100%.	
	
The	 results	 for	prevalence	of	 several	 voice	 and	exit	 channels	 are	 contained	 in	 Table	3.9.	 The	
results	 are	presented	 in	 the	order	 in	which	 they	appear	 in	 the	 survey.	As	 the	 responses	 that	
occur	first	are	not	necessarily	those	that	are	chosen	most	often,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	“primacy	
effect”	bias	is	present	here.	The	results	show	a	high	level	of	engagement,	because	only	4%	has	
not	taken	any	measures	of	shareholder	engagement.	Table	3.9	shows	that	“discussions	with	top	
management”	at	board	level	 (73%),	“voting	against	management”	(73%)	and	“writing	a	 letter	
to	 management”	 (62%)	 are	 the	 most	 important	 engagement	 channels.	 These	 channels	 are	
consistent	 with	 the	 results	 of	 McCahery,	 Sautner	 and	 Starks	 (2016).	 Next,	 “selling	 shares	
because	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 performance”	 (58%)	 and	 “selling	 shares	 because	 of	
dissatisfaction	with	social	or	environmental	practices”	 (54%)	are	 important	exit	 channels.	The	
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use	 of	 the	 engagement	 channel	 “discussions	 with	 the	 Board	 of	 Directors6	 outside	 of	
management”	(54%)	is	consistent	with	the	finding	by	McCahery,	Sautner	and	Starks	(2016)	that	
investors	first	try	to	engage	with	firms	behind	the	scenes	and	only	take	public	measures	if	these	
private	 discussions	 fail.	 It	 also	 explains	 why	 “publicly	 criticising	 management	 in	 the	 media”	
ranks	so	low.		
Hedge	 funds,	which	are	not	 included	 in	our	survey,	are	 important	activist	 investors,	engaging	
with	 target	 companies.	 De	 Jong,	 Roosenboom,	 Verbeek	 and	 Verwijmeren	 (2007)	 report	 on	
hedge	fund	activism	in	the	Netherlands	from	1985	till	2007.	The	intentions	of	hedge	funds	refer	
to	a	change	in	corporate	strategy	(35%),	sale	or	company	split	(38%),	influence	intended	take-
over	(12%),	change	in	governance	structure	(8%)	and	more	dividend	or	share	buy-back	(15%).	In	
a	 more	 recent	 international	 survey	 (including	 the	 Netherlands)	 from	 2000	 till	 2010,	 Becht,	
Franks,	Grant	and	Wagner	(2017)	find	that	almost	one-quarter	of	hedge	fund	engagements	are	
by	 multi-activists	 engaging	 the	 same	 target.	 These	 engagements	 perform	 better	 than	 single	
activist	engagements.	
	
Table	3.9:	Prevalence	of	voice	and	exit	channels		
Number in 
survey Measures of Shareholder Engagement Taken in the Past 5 Years 
Percentage 
that took 
this measure 
   
1 None 4% 
2 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with performance 58% 
3 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with corporate governance practices 50% 
4 Voting against management at the annual meeting (AGM) 73% 
5 Selling shares because of dissatisfaction with social or environmental practices 54% 
6 Publicly criticising management in the media 19% 
7 Legal action against management (e.g. file a lawsuit, participate in a class action) 35% 
8 Submitting shareholder proposals for the proxy statement 31% 
9 Discussions with members of the Board of Directors outside of management 54% 
10 Discussions with top management 73% 
11 Criticizing management and the board at the annual meeting (AGM) 35% 
12 Publicising a dissenting vote 27% 
13 Writing a letter to management 62% 
14 Aggressively questioning management in a conference call 15% 
15 Proposing specific actions to management (e.g. sell assets, fire the CEO) 46% 
16 Other 19% 
   
  Total observations 26 
Note:	The	most	important	engagement	channels	are	in	bold.	
																																								 																				
6	The	Board	of	Directors	is	here	without	the	non-executive	members.	
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Other	issues	
The	survey	also	covers	the	use	of	proxy	advisors.	Table	3.10	indicates	that	69%	of	respondents	
make	 use	 of	 an	 external	 proxy	 advisor	 before	 the	 Annual	 General	 Meeting	 of	 shareholders	
(AGM).	 Investors	 use	 the	 proxy	 advice	 to	 determine	 their	 own	 position.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	
McCahery,	Sautner	and	Starks	 (2016),	who	find	that	 investors	report	 that	proxy	advisors	help	
them	make	better	 voting	decisions,	but	 that	 they	 remain	 their	own	decision	makers.	 ISS	and	
Glass-Lewis	are	the	most	important	proxy	advisors.	
	
Table	3.10:	Use	of	proxy	advisors		
 Total 
	 Percentage 
Use of external proxy advisor before AGM  
Always 42 
That depends on the company 12 
That depends on the agenda item 8 
That depends on the circumstances 8 
Never 31 
  Extent to which advice is fully used  
Follow advice fully 6 
Take into account to determine own position 90 
Take into account in case of doubts 0 
Other 6 
  
Which advisor  
ISS 27 
Glass-Lewis 12 
Undisclosed 50 
Other 12 
	  Shares held back to short-sell  
Fraction of shares (%) 2.4 
  
Total observations 26 
Note:	The	percentages	add	vertically	up	to	100%.	
	
Next,	 the	 survey	 examines	 legal	 arrangements	 or	 take-over	 defenses.	 Table	 3.11	 report	 that	
pyramid	 structures	 and	 dual-class	 shares	 are	 prohibitive;	 a	 majority	 of	 investors	 would	 not	
invest	in	companies	with	this	type	of	legal	arrangement.	Priority	shares	and	loyalty	voting	rights	
are	 only	 for	 36%	 of	 respondents	 a	 reason	 not	 to	 invest.	 Finally,	 investors	 are	 largely	 (72%)	
indifferent	about	certificates	and	anti-takeover	preferred	shares.		
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Table	3.11:	Legal	arrangements		
  We would not invest We are indifferent More likely to invest 
        
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Legal Arrangements       
Binding nomination 16 84 0 
Anti-takeover preferred shares 24 72 4 
Certificates 24 72 4 
Priority shares 36 64 0 
Loyalty voting rights 36 64 0 
Pyramid structure 52 48 0 
Dual-class shares 44 56 0 
        
Total observations 25  25 25  
Note:	The	percentages	add	horizontally	up	to	100%.	
	
	
3.4 Interviews	
Face-to-face	interviews	provide	in-depth	qualitative	data	that	is	a	very	powerful	addition	to	the	
quantitative	data	provided	by	 the	 survey.	The	 survey	 identifies	motives,	engagement	 triggers	
and	methods	 in	 a	 structured	 way,	 whereas	 the	 interviews	 are	 used	 to	 provide	 some	 of	 the	
detail	 and	 the	 narrative	 of	 how	 concepts	 are	 applied	 and	 what	 potential	 bottlenecks	 and	
dilemmas	 investors	 face	 in	 the	process	of	adopting	a	 long-term	perspective.	 Long-term	value	
creation	 can	 still	 be	 considered	 a	 relatively	 qualitative	 concept	 requiring	 qualitative	
performance	measures	 (Barton	&	Wiseman,	2014).	The	 format	 is	a	 semi-structured	 interview	
and	participants	are	provided	with	a	topic	guide	that	includes	six	themes	that	define	the	area	
that	 will	 be	 exploited	 (long-term	 value	 creation).	 For	 each	 of	 the	 themes	 a	 concept	 map	 is	
developed	depicting	the	most	important	concepts	that	emerged	during	the	interviews.	
The	 interviews	 took	 place	 in	 July	 and	August	 2017.	 The	 aim	of	 the	 selection	 procedure	 is	 to	
select	 the	most	knowledgeable	 informants	 from	a	diverse	variety	of	 institutional	 investors.	 In	
total	ten	large	shareholders	of	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies	participated	in	the	interviews,	
whereby	 the	 different	 blockholder	 types	 are	 represented.	 The	 results	 do	 not	 identify	 any	
company	or	individual	name	of	interview	participants.	
	
Definition	of	long-term	value	creation		
On	 the	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	 creation,	 all	 investors	 indicate	 that	 a	 high	 and	 stable	
financial	return	is	their	most	important	goal.	Second,	a	remark	that	recurred	during	a	majority	
of	 the	 interviews	 is	 that	 investors	view	“long-term	value	creation”	as	a	broad	and	sometimes	
even	“all-purpose”	concept.	Nevertheless,	most	investors	argue	that	long-term	returns	can	only	
be	realised	by	investing	in	and	engaging	with	companies	that	are	capable	of	adding	value	over	
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the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	positive	or	at	least	a	less	negative	effect	on	society.	Investors	
want	 to	contribute	to	 financial	stability	and	add	value	to	the	real	economy,	which	 is	done	by	
taking	 into	 account	 more	 than	 only	 financial	 factors.	 A	 very	 important	 concept	 here	 is	
“stakeholders”:	 a	 company	 cannot	 create	 value	 over	 the	 long-term	 if	 it	 does	 not	 take	 into	
account	the	interests	of	all	stakeholders	versus	shareholders	only.	ESG	factors	are	mentioned	in	
every	interview.	
Additionally,	one	of	the	insurance	companies	sees	long-term	value	creation	as	a	way	to	reduce	
its	risk.	It	indicates	that	companies,	which	pay	attention	to	for	example	ESG	factors,	are	better	
capable	 of	 managing	 their	 risks	 and	 therefore	 considered	 to	 be	 more	 attractive	 investment	
opportunities.		
Most	 investors	 consider	 long-term	as	 being	 “more	 than	 five	 years”.	 Larger	 investors	 indicate	
that	equity	capital	or	“shares”	as	an	asset	class	are,	by	default,	more	short-term	and	liquid	than	
other	asset	classes.	One	commercial	investment	fund	was	quite	an	exception	when	answering	
this	question.	This	fund	views	a	“three	year	horizon”	as	already	very	long,	indicating	that:	“as	an	
investor,	 you	are	 only	 as	 good	as	 your	 last	 year’s	 performance”.	 	 This	 investor	 indicates	 that	
clients	 exert	 pressure	 on	 them	 to	 perform	well	 in	 the	 short-term.	 This	 subsequently	 induces	
them	to	chase	“momentum”	and	 invest	 in	companies	 that	are	doing	well,	even	though	these	
companies	might	not	be	the	best	investments	over	a	longer	horizon.	They	fear	that	if	they	fail	
to	do	this,	their	clients	will	simply	go	to	another	fund.		
Conversely,	other	 (oftentimes	smaller)	 investors	point	to	a	horizon	of	ten	years	or	more.	This	
distinction	 is	 important.	 Looking	 across	 all	 interviews,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
long-term	goals	are	really	pursued	by	an	investor	depends	on	the	business	model,	investment	
belief	and	the	mandate	the	investor	has	been	given	by	asset	owners/clients.	Most	funds	argue	
it	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	 (large)	
diversified	 portfolios.	 Family	 offices	 and	 smaller	 investment	 funds	 indicate	 that	 their	
concentrated	 portfolio	 enables	 them	 to	 engage	 in	 constant	 dialogues	 with	 a	 selected	 set	 of	
companies.	 They	 are	 able	 to	 compensate	 their	 “lack”	 of	 diversification	 with	 exceptional	
knowledge	about	the	firms	they	are	invested	in.		
Lastly,	one	 large	 investment	 fund	and	one	 large	pension	 fund	asset	manager	argued	that	not	
only	 active	 investments	 are	 geared	 towards	 the	 long-term.	 They	 provide	 the	 contrarian	
argument,	pleading	that	passive	investments	are	by	definition	long-term:	“as	a	passive	investor,	
you	cannot	sell.	You	are	invested	in	companies	as	long	as	they	constitute	the	index	and	for	large	
Dutch	 firms,	 this	 can	 be	 decades.	We	 need	 to	 work	 with	 companies	 on	 achieving	 long-term	
changes.	As	long	as	companies	are	making	progress,	we	can	be	patient,	because	we	will	be	at	
the	table	with	them	year	after	year	after	year.”	
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Performance	Metrics	Used	to	Assess	Portfolio	Companies		
One	 can	 distinguish	 between	 two	 broad	 types	 of	 investment	 strategies.	 The	 more	 passive	
investment	strategies	that	are	tracking	an	index	use	metrics,	such	as	tracking	error,	information	
ratio	and	Sharpe	ratio.	Funds	with	clients	who	have	longer-term	obligations	indicate	that	their	
clients	 (asset	 owners)	 assess	 their	 fund’s	 performance	 based	 on	 longer-term	 (i.e.	 five-year)	
returns.	 Even	 though	 this	 is	 a	 considerably	 lengthy	 period,	 the	 fact	 that	 investors	 follow	 a	
benchmark	indicates	they	are	not	consciously	selecting	companies	for	which	they	believe	that	
they	will	add	value	over	the	 long	run.	One	 large	pension	fund	(asset	manager)	 indicates	that,	
depending	 on	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 asset	 owner,	 it	 does	 sometimes	 have	 some	 flexibility	 to	
adjust	benchmarks	and	add	ESG	factors	for	example.	
Most	investors	believe	transparency	and	disclosure	from	portfolio	companies	is	very	important.	
When	 considering	 the	 period	 of	 performance	 reviews,	 one	 large	 passive	 investment	 fund	
indicates	that:	“we	are	not	saying	that	quarterly	reporting	is	completely	wrong	by	definition.	We	
just	think	that	the	language	around	it	needs	to	be	changed:	more	forward-looking	in	relation	to	
the	 long-term	 strategy,	 rather	 than	 observed	 in	 vacuum”.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 large	 active	
investment	 funds	has	 an	opposite	 view	 saying:	“because	we	as	an	 investor	have	a	 long-term	
horizon,	performance	also	needs	to	be	assessed	on	the	long-term”.	This	fund	also	includes	the	
performance	 evaluation	 of	 its	 own	 asset	 managers	 (discussed	 at	 the	 sub-section	 Barriers	
below).	
The	other,	more	active	investment	strategies	are	those	that	use	fundamental	analysis	based	on	
a	company’s	cash	flows,	return	on	invested	capital,	EBITDA	margins	and	growth	prospects.	All	
these	metrics	are	used	to	arrive	at	the	intrinsic	value	of	a	company.	Since	one	cannot	observe	
fundamental	 metrics	 beyond	 a	 three/five	 year	 horizon,	 one	 insurance	 company	 indicates	 it	
does	 a	 valuation	 and	 then	places	 this	 value	within	 the	 context	of	 longer	 term	 trends	 for	 the	
company	/	sector	/	market	and	subsequently	applies	a	discount	or	a	premium.	
All	 investors	 highly	 value	 trust	 and	 capable	 (reliable)	management,	 even	 though	 this	 point	 is	
most	 strongly	 emphasized	 by	 the	 more	 concentrated	 investment	 funds	 (for	 example	 Family	
Offices).	 Having	 a	 concentrated	 portfolio	 enables	 these	 investors	 to	 engage	 in	 constant	
dialogues	with	management.		
Interestingly,	 the	more	active	portfolios	seem	to	have	a	more	 flexible	mandate.	They	are	not	
“punished”	 by	 their	 asset	 owners	 for	 (temporary)	 deviations	 from	 benchmarks	 and	 their	
performance	 is	 neither	 judged	 on	 absolute,	 nor	 relative	 returns.	 They	 look	 past	 (short-term)	
swings	in	the	stock	price,	but	more	at	the	intrinsic	value	of	the	company.	Nevertheless,	when	
looking	 over	 the	 long-term,	 all	 these	 active	 investors	 indicated	 they	 have	 outperformed	
benchmarks	 significantly.	 They	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 a	 proven	 investment	 philosophy	 that	works.	
The	 tension	 that	 is	 created	 by	 benchmarks	 is	 also	 highlighted	 by	 large	 pension	 fund	 asset	
managers:	“you	cannot	 invest	 for	 the	 long-term	by	 fundamentally	assessing	 firms	AND	at	 the	
same	time	be	judged	by	asset	owners	on	your	performance	versus	a	benchmark”.	Proponents	of	
the	long-term	strategy	point	to	the	fact	that	investors	need	to	let	go	of	these	benchmarks	and	
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merely	 use	 them	 as	 a	 “reference	 index”.	 One	 investment	 fund	 even	 calls	 active	 investments	
“benchmark	 agnostic”	 and	 indicates	 that	 value	 creation	 on	 the	 long-term	 is	 a	 combination	
between	economic	profit,	stock	market	returns	and	ESG	factors.	
All	investors	indicate	that	they	increasingly	use	ESG	factors	such	as	CO2	emissions,	governance	
issues	and	human	rights	when	valuing,	selecting	and	assessing	companies.	Nearly	all	 investors	
explicitly	indicate	that	companies	which	care	about	and	perform	well	on	these	dimensions,	will	
also	 create	more	 financial	 value	 in	 the	 long-run:	 “For	 us,	 ESG	 is	 not	 a	 tick-the-box	 element”.	
Most	investors	use	self-developed	ESG	indicators	whereas	some	others	rely	on	scores	from,	for	
example,	 Sustainalitics.	 Various	 investors	 indicate	 that	 more	 standardised	 measures	 or	
examples	of	“best	practices”	or	“KPIs”	could	be	beneficial	for	the	industry.			
	
Motives	to	engage	in	long-term	value	creation	
Because	of	the	 long-term	nature	of	their	obligations,	pension	funds	and	 insurance	companies	
want	 to	make	sure	 that	 the	asset	side	 is	also	capable	of	creating	value	on	a	 long	horizon.	All	
investors	mention	the	instrumental	motives:	they	invest	in	order	to	generate	returns	and	they	
believe	that	investing	in	sustainable	companies	with	a	solid	business	model	will	enable	them	to	
keep	 generating	 these	 returns	 long	 horizons	 (more	 than	 five	 years).	 Over	 the	 years,	 the	
instrumental	(financial)	motives	have	been	complemented	with	additional	motives,	such	as	the	
will	to	achieve	change	and	retaining	the	social	license	to	operate	by	having	a	positive	impact	on	
society.		
One	of	the	most	important	determinants	is	the	“investment	belief”	or	the	“investment	ethos”	
that	 is	 ingrained	 in	an	 institution.	This	can	be	seen	as	an	 intrinsic	motivation.	Some	 investors	
simply	have	the	strong	investment	belief	that	responsible	investing	(and	investing	for	the	long-
term)	coincides	with	strong	financial	returns.	Moreover,	a	long-term	focus	is	better	for	clients	
and	companies.	Once	this	belief	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	strategy	of	the	firm,	it	can	be	put	into	
practice	 without	 repeatedly	 being	 questioned.	 One	 of	 the	 interviewees	 indicates:	 “It	 is	 our	
responsibility	to	be	stewards	of	capital”.		
Another	 key	 driver	 to	 invest	 in	 long-term	 value	 creation	 is	 client	 demand	 (or	 the	 wishes/	
mandates	of	 asset	 owners).	 Investing	 is	 effectively	 a	 service	business	 and	 client	 demand	 is	 a	
very	 important	 consideration	 when	 deciding	 on	 the	 strategy	 that	 will	 be	 pursued.	 Hence,	
fiduciary	duty	 is	a	key	concept.	 Interestingly,	 international	 interviewees	 indicate	that	they	are	
increasingly	 held	 accountable	 by	Dutch	 clients;	more	 than	 in	 other	markets.	 Not	 only	 to	 the	
extent	to	which	they	are	committed	to	ESG,	but	also	to	the	extent	to	which	ESG	influences	their	
portfolios.		
Lastly,	other	factors	providing	additional	guidance	on	this	matter	are	for	example	the	Corporate	
Governance	 Code,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Principles	 or	 Responsible	 Investments	 (PRI),	 or	 other	
movements	such	as	Focusing	Capital	on	the	Long-Term.	Most	investors	have	signed	or	became	
part	of	one	or	multiple	of	these	initiatives,	thereby	signalling	their	commitment.		
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Engagement	mechanisms		
Engagement	 consists	 of	 a	 number	 of	 subsequent	 steps,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 that	 the	 exact	
methods	differ	 across	 investor	 types.	 The	 frequency	 and	how	 the	methods	 are	 employed	do	
differ.	Most	investors	indicate	to	actively	pursue	SRI	(sustainable,	responsible	impact	investing)	
engagement.	One	widely	used	mechanism	is	exclusion.	Thus,	excluded	companies	are	already	in	
advance	 not	 considered	 for	 investments	 (e.g.	 tobacco	 industry).	 One	 pension	 fund	 (asset	
manager)	 did	 indicate	 that	 extending	 the	 list	 of	 “excluded	 companies”	 does	 mean	 that	
portfolios	deviate	from	benchmarks	more,	and	this	is	not	something	that	all	portfolio	managers	
are	 equally	 excited	 about.	 Most	 investors	 also	 use	 (positive)	 screening.	 For	 example,	 when	
deciding	 to	 invest	 in	 an	oil	 and	gas	 company,	 they	pick	 the	 company	with	 the	 strongest	 ESG	
performance.		
Different	performance	metrics	 (financial	and	non-financial)	are	used	to	assess	companies	and	
determine	which	companies	need	to	be	targeted.	The	larger	funds	indicate	that	engagement	is	
primarily	driven	by	 the	more	active	holdings,	 as	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	engage	 in	a	dialogue	with	
thousands	 of	 portfolio	 companies.	 Voting	 rights	 are	 used	 extensively	 (with	 almost	 every	
company),	as	these	are	considered	to	be	the	primary	rights	of	shareholders.		
Most	investors	indicate	that	(constant)	dialogues	with	portfolio	companies	are	most	important.	
They	rather	engage	in	private	(behind	the	scenes)	than	in	public	engagement.	Even	the	AGM	is	
not	 seen	 as	 the	 most	 interesting	 moment	 for	 engagement.	 More	 important	 is	 the	 period	
running	 up	 to	 the	AGM.	Only	 few	 investors	 have	 indicated	 that	 they	 have	 recently	 used	 the	
media	 to	publicly	communicate	 their	viewpoint	on	a	certain	matter.	Media	attention	 is	often	
not	considered	as	supportive	of	long-term	goals.		
For	most	 large	 funds,	 the	corporate	governance	specialists	decide	on	 the	engagement	policy,	
whereas	 the	 portfolio	 managers	 take	 the	 investment	 decisions	 and	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
actual	engagement.	This	can	 lead	to	situations	 in	which	no	 integrated	decisions	are	made.	All	
investors	 indicate	 they	 make	 use	 of	 collective	 engagement	 (with	 other	 investors),	 as	 they	
believe	this	enables	them	to	have	a	stronger	voice.	Of	critical	 importance	here	are	regulatory	
considerations	 (e.g.	 acting	 in	 concert	 rules)	 and	 finding	 investors	 that	 are	 like-minded.	
Collective	engagement	and	collaboration	only	work	if	investors	have	similar	investment	beliefs.	
All	investors	indicate	that	they	make	extensive	use	of	Eumedion	(and	equivalent	bodies	in	other	
countries)	 to	 communicate	with	 other	 investors.	 These	 dialogues	 stimulate	 relationships	 and	
trust	 among	 investors.	 Engagement	with	 Dutch	 companies	 is	 considered	 as	 very	 pleasant	 by	
most	investors,	due	to	the	proximity	of	management	and	good	governance	practices.	
On	 the	 concept	 of	 exit,	 a	 distinction	 is	 made	 between	 active	 investments	 and	 passive	
investments	that	follow	a	benchmark.	For	active	investments,	most	investors	will	only	exit	after	
an	extensive	period	of	 engagement	 (if	 they	believe	 in	 the	 company).	 Sometimes,	 if	 investors	
deem	 a	 business	 model	 to	 be	 “broken”,	 they	 will	 exit	 earlier.	 More	 commercial	 investment	
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funds	 are	 more	 inclined	 to	 exit	 if	 companies	 are	 underperforming	 (i.e.	 their	 share	 is	
underperforming)	 but	 for	 all	 investors	 holds	 that	 “trust”	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 of	 critical	
importance.	 Threat	 of	 exit	 is	 not	 something	 investors	 use	 explicitly,	 especially	 not	 publicly:	
often	companies	are	already	aware	of	the	situation	as	constructive	conversations	take	place	in	
an	earlier	stage.	Multiple	interviewees	referred	to	the	“carrot	and	stick”	idiom,	indicating	they	
try	 to	 use	 the	 carrot	 more	 than	 the	 stick.	 But	 if	 things	 are	 really	 not	 working	 out,	 exit	 is	
inevitable.	Not	following	through	would	undermine	investors’	credibility.		
Family	 offices	 have	 smaller,	more	 concentrated	 portfolios	 and	 large	 stakes	 in	 the	 companies	
they	 invest	 in.	 They	 see	 themselves	 as	 cooperative	 and	 constructive	 shareholders,	 having	
dialogues	with	 companies	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 These	 funds	 explicitly	 indicate	 to	 prefer	 engaging	
behind	 the	 scenes.	 Interestingly,	 family	offices	 indicate	 they	do	not	 feel	“exit	pressure”:	 they	
can	 remain	 invested	 in	 companies	 they	 believe	 in,	 even	 if	 these	 companies	 are	 temporarily	
underperforming	or	suffering	from	a	crisis.	Often	these	funds	have	a	turn-over	of	only	one	or	
two	 companies	 a	 year.	 This	 is	 possible	 because	 the	 fund’s	 performance	 is	 not	 related	 to	 an	
annual	benchmark:	 the	structure	and	 investment	strategy	of	 these	 funds	enables	 them	to	be	
true	long-term	investors.	This	approach	is	more	suitable	for	small	to	medium	size	enterprises.	
For	 large	companies	 turn-overs	are	much	more	 frequent	because	 these	companies	are	much	
more	liquid	and	can	be	influenced	less	by	individual	investors.	
	
Barriers	when	focusing	capital	on	the	long-term	
The	social	system	in	which	investors	operate	is	very	complex.	Investors	need	to	simultaneously	
balance	 the	 interests	 of	 many	 different	 stakeholders,	 such	 as	 their	 asset	 owners,	 their	
regulators,	the	companies	they	are	invested	in	and	their	own	board	of	directors.	Already	eight	
years	ago,	Kemna	and	Van	de	Loo	(2009)	highlighted	strategic,	informational,	social-emotional	
and	procedural	complexity,	which	is	still	prominent	today.	
On	 external	 barriers,	 an	 often	 mentioned	 barrier	 is	 prudential	 supervision	 and	 (legal)	
restrictions	 placed	 upon	 investors	 by	 regulators.	 The	 Dutch	 prudential	 supervisor	 (DNB)	
requires	 large	 institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	
requirements	and	 financial	 risk	management	metrics.	As	argued	by	one	 the	 respondents,	 the	
Dutch	 supervisor	 even	 explicitly	 penalises	 pension	 funds	 for	 using	 active	management,	 with	
higher	 solvency	 requirements	 in	 its	new	FTK	 regulatory	 framework.	An	exception	 is	made	 for	
equity	 portfolios	 that	 have	 a	 tracking	 error	 of	 less	 than	 1%.	 Insurance	 companies	 explicitly	
mention	 Solvency	 II.	 These	 constraints	 in	 turn	 pressure	 investors	 into	 generating	 short-term	
returns,	rather	than	focusing	on	long-term	investments.	It	is	known	that	the	use	of	short-term	
benchmarks	 enhances	 short-termism,	 but	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurance	 companies	 are	 not	
allowed	to	simply	choose	another	(non-standard)	benchmark.	One	must	not	only	be	willing	but	
also	 able	 to	 be	 patient	 and	 accept	 (temporary)	 set-backs	 in	 stock	 performance	 of	 portfolio	
companies.	 According	 to	 investors,	 outcomes	 of	 longer-term	 strategies	 are	more	 ambiguous	
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and	their	risk	is	often	harder	to	measure	(volatility	is	a	short-term	metric).	It	is	hard	to	accept	
more	uncertainty	while	still	adhering	to	the	regulatory	frameworks.		
As	 a	 result	 of	 several	 prominent	 take-over	 attempts	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2017,	 tensions	 have	
emerged	in	the	Netherlands.	Dutch	politics	 is	 looking	into	ways	of	protecting	companies	from	
hostile	take-overs	and	making	sure	that	management	has	sufficient	time	to	respond	in	case	of	a	
(hostile)	bid,	for	example	by	means	of	a	legal	time-out	or	cooling-off	period.	More	time	means	
management	 can	 take	 deliberate	 decisions	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 all	 stakeholders.	
Nevertheless,	 not	 all	 investors	 are	 equally	 happy	 about	 these	 developments.	 During	 the	
interviews,	some	investors	(both	Dutch	and	foreign)	have	indicated	their	concerns,	as	they	are	
afraid	that	 the	 introduction	of	new	 legislation	might	 lead	to	an	erosion	of	shareholder	rights.	
During	cooling-off	periods	for	example,	shareholders	might	be	blocked	from	engagement.	This	
would	 even	 hold	 for	 very	 long-term	 shareholders	 that	 have	 been	 with	 the	 company	 for	
decades.	One	interviewee	said:	“Effectively,	we	cannot	do	our	job	if	we	don’t	have	the	tools	to	
hold	 companies	 accountable.	 Shareholder	 rights	 are	 being	 slowly	 eroded	 for	 various	 reasons.	
And	when	you	take	away	our	rights,	then	the	only	option	is	to	sell.	This	 is	not	ideal	because	it	
creates	short-termism”.	
The	next	external	barrier	is	disclosure	by	portfolio	companies.	It	is	hard	for	investors	to	form	a	
long-term	view	of	a	company	and	assess	their	potential,	 if	they	are	not	given	the	information	
that	enables	 them	 to	do	 that.	All	 companies	use	different	methods	 to	 report	ESG	 factors	 for	
example.	A	more	standardised	approach	would	be	beneficial.		
Investors	also	need	to	take	the	mandate	of	their	asset	owners	and	the	wishes	of	their	clients	
into	careful	consideration.	This	 is	the	most	 important	determinant	of	the	 investment	strategy	
that	 is	 pursued.	 Asset	 owners	 may	 judge	 an	 investors’	 performance	 based	 on	 a	 short-term	
benchmark	 or	 put	 more	 emphasis	 on	 strong	 financial	 rather	 than	 socially	 responsible	
performance.	 Investors	need	 to	adhere	 to	 these	wishes.	Thus,	 key	here	 is	 that	 the	 triangular	
interests	between	asset	owner,	asset	manager	and	company	are	aligned.	Therefore,	in	order	to	
truly	maintain	 a	 long-term	 focus,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 all	 three	actors	 to	have	 long-term	goals.	
According	to	one	insurance	company:	“we	are	evaluated	by	our	clients.	Asset	managers	cannot	
move	 without	 asset	 owners	 moving	 preferably	 beforehand	 or	 at	 least	 at	 the	 same	 time”.	
Another	clear	example	of	this	is	family	offices:	they	indicate	that	they	do	not	experience	any	of	
these	barriers	 as	 they	deal	with	 less	 regulatory	 issues	 and	have	 a	 very	 flexible	mandate.	 For	
them,	the	chain	from	asset	owner	to	asset	manager	is	short	and	works	efficiently.		
The	 last	 external	 barrier	 is	 the	monthly	 performance	 rankings	 between	 investors.	 The	media	
compares	investment	funds	with	each	other	on	one,	three	and	six	months	intervals	and	makes	
all	sorts	of	rankings.	This	is	not	supportive	of	a	long-term	focus	but	gives	rise	to	short-termism.	
Looking	at	more	 internal	barriers,	an	 important	one	 is	 compensation.	Out-performance	often	
yields	 high	 fees,	 and	 this	 inevitably	 stimulates	 asset	 managers	 to	 have	 a	 more	 short-term	
orientation.	Compensation	is	a	very	powerful	tool	to	align	incentives	and	stimulate	a	change	in	
behaviour.	One	large	investment	fund	indicates	it	maintains	a	longer-term	horizon	by	having	a	
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balanced	performance	strategy	for	evaluation.	It	says:	“you	need	to	walk	the	talk,	so	internally	
we	assess	our	products	by	evaluating	portfolio	managers	based	on	a	combination	of	1,	3	and	5-
year	performance	where	most	weight	 is	placed	on	3	year	performance	and	1	and	5	years	are	
equally	important.”	
Another	barrier	 is	 that	 actively	 investing	 in	 and	engaging	with	 companies	 also	 requires	more	
feet	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 inevitably	 costs	more	 time	 and	money.	 Lastly,	many	 asset	managers	
have	 been	 educated	 classically	 and	most	 professionals	 have	 been	 conditioned	 into	 a	 certain	
way	of	thinking.	Our	brains	are	“wired”	towards	the	short-term.	Therefore	a	fund’s	investment	
belief	 is	 critical.	 Investors	who	 truly	have	a	 long-term	horizon	must	be	patient	and	must	also	
signal	to	their	asset	managers	that	they	are	in	support	of	a	long-term	strategy:	the	plug	cannot	
be	pulled	at	the	first	signs	of	under-performance.	We	must	dare	to	let	go	of	the	conventional	
way	of	thinking	and	this	requires	a	paradigm	shift.		
	
The	future	of	focusing	capital	on	the	long-term	
A	 paradigm	 shift	 is	 needed	 and	 this	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 new	
(finance)	professionals.	Not	only	the	universities	but	also	the	CFA	program	are	important	in	this.	
Sustainable	finance	must	not	be	viewed	as	a	separate	branch,	but	as	an	integral	part	of	finance.	
Next,	 incentives	need	 to	be	aligned.	Not	only	 internally	 towards	asset	managers	by	adjusting	
their	compensation	structure,	but	also	externally	between	all	the	players	in	the	complex	social	
system.	Important	here	are	companies,	which	need	to	work	on	their	disclosure,	and	regulators	
which	 need	 to	 adjust	 their	 policies	 and	 remove	 current	 obstacles	 that	 hinder	 long-term	
investment.	
One	additional	solution	mentioned	by	an	investment	fund	is	that	they	could	start	offering	new	
products	that	are	closed-ended.	This	type	of	product	deters	impatient	clients	as	they	cannot	get	
out	on	a	daily	basis	but	need	to	commit	their	capital	for	a	longer	period.	It	could	possible	cause	
a	better	match	between	the	investment	philosophy	of	clients	and	investors.		
Lastly,	according	to	one	interviewee	who	is	a	strong	proponent	of	focusing	capital	on	the	long-
term,	a	new	model	is	needed.	“A	long-term	oriented	mandate	is	needed	between	asset	owners,	
asset	managers	and	companies.	This	model	needs	to	include	an	entirely	new	framework	of	the	
types	of	KPIs,	benchmarks,	risk	management	tools,	incentives	and	bonuses	that	are	used”.	
	
Relation	to	survey	
In	 the	survey,	all	 investors	answer	 that	 they	care	about	 long-term	value	creation.	 In	practice,	
the	interviewed	investors	indicate	they	consider	financial	motives	as	being	the	most	important	
determinant	to	 invest	 in	 long-term	value	creation.	This	 is	 in	 line	with	the	results	presented	 in	
Table	3.4	of	the	survey	results.	The	finding	makes	common	sense,	as	generating	returns	is	what	
investing	is	about.	Therefore	valuing	financial	goals	does	not	necessarily	need	to	imply	a	short-
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term	 focus.	 Nevertheless,	 what	 distinguishes	 truly	 long-term	 oriented	 investors	 from	 other	
investors	 is	 the	emphasis	 they	put	on	other	 stakeholders	 (the	wider	 stakeholder	model;	 also	
taking	 into	 account	 social	 and	 environmental	 factors	 for	 example).	Many	 investors	 explicitly	
mention	 stakeholders	 when	 they	 are	 asked	 to	 provide	 their	 definition	 of	 long-term	 value	
creation.	 In	 the	 survey,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 score	 these	 factors	 higher.	 Also,	 in	 the	
interviews,	 different	 types	 of	 investors	 mention	 that	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 are	 front-
runners	when	it	comes	to	sustainable	investing	practices.		
Interviews	disclose	that	the	mandate	of	asset	owners	/	obligation	towards	clients	 is	 the	most	
important	determinant	of	investment	strategies.	This	is	in	line	with	the	results	from	Table	3.5,	
indicating	that	the	wishes	of	the	primary	beneficiaries	are	an	important	motive	to	pursue	long-
term	 value	 creation.	 It	 also	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 aligned	 triangular	 interests	
between	 asset	 owners,	 asset	 managers	 and	 companies	 in	 order	 to	 escape	 from	 “short-
termism”.		
Lastly,	 another	 result	 from	 the	 survey	 that	 is	 emphasised	 in	 the	 interviews	 is	 that	 investors	
prefer	behind	the	scenes	(private)	engagement	over	public	engagement.	Trust	and	cooperation	
with	management	are	found	to	be	very	important,	and	this	has	increased	in	the	last	couple	of	
years.	 So	 not	 only	 are	 company	 managers	 more	 open	 to	 collaborate	 with	 large,	 engaged	
investors	but	also	investors	themselves	are	mutually	engaging	in	dialogues.	In	the	Netherlands,	
Eumedion	is	considered	as	the	most	effective	platform	for	this.	
	
3.5 Voting	behaviour	
Ideally,	 this	 study	would	 include	the	voting	behaviour	of	 large	shareholders	of	Dutch	 firms	at	
the	shareholder	meetings.	In	the	US,	institutional	investors	are	required	to	disclose	their	voting	
for	each	 firm	and	per	agenda	 item.	Also	 in	 the	Dutch	 setting	 this	 information	 is	 available	 for	
large	institutional	investors.	We	have	contacted	ISS,	the	largest	data	warehouse	on	voting,	but	
they	could	not	provide	voting	data	for	blockolders	in	Dutch	firms	to	us.	Although	we	have	been	
able	 to	 find	 evidence	 of	 Dutch	 shareholders	 disclosing	 information	 about	 voting,	 this	 only	
applies	 to	 a	 minority	 of	 the	 blockholdings,	 which	 would	 lead	 to	 an	 unreliable	 sample	 for	
inferences	about	shareholder	voting	behaviour.	We	therefore	prefer	not	to	discuss	the	voting	
behaviour.	
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Chapter	4:	Conclusions	
	
4.1 Summary	of	findings	
	
Blockholdings	
On	average	24.1%	of	the	shares	are	held	by	shareholders	with	a	stake	of	5%	or	more,	and	the	
average	firm	has	2.3	blockholders.	Over	the	period	2006-2016,	the	concentration	of	ownership	
has	decreased,	 from	34.6%	to	24.1%	ownership	by	blockholders.	 In	the	Netherlands,	 financial	
institutions,	including	pension	funds,	are	relatively	unimportant	as	blockholders	in	Dutch-listed	
companies,	while	individuals	are	blockholders	with	the	largest	average	blocks	of	shares.	Further	
analyses	show	that	46%	of	the	blockholdings	in	2016	have	been	established	more	than	10	years	
earlier.	There	 is	a	 trade-off	between	ownership	concentration	on	 the	one	hand	and	 takeover	
defenses	and	liquidty	on	the	other	hand:	firms	with	blockholders	are	less	protected	by	takeover	
defenses	and	have	lower	liquidity.	
The	 development	 over	 the	 past	 decade	 is	 interesting,	 because	 concentrated	 shareholdings	
facilitate	 a	 long-term	 orientation	 (see	 section	 4.3).	 Blockholders	 have	 the	 voting	 power	 to	
influence	firms,	while	reduced	liquidity	makes	voting	with	the	feet	expensive.	The	development	
for	Dutch	firms	where	ownership	concentration	is	reduced	thus	affects	the	potential	for	 long-
term	 oriented	 shareholders	 negatively.	 Simultaneously,	 shareholdings	 in	 Dutch	 corporations	
are	 increasingly	held	by	 foreign	 institutional	 investors	with	 relatively	 small	 stakes,	which	also	
limits	the	potential	for	shareholder	engagement	with	a	long-term	horizon.	
	
Survey	and	interview	outcomes	
Long-term	value	creation	
The	vast	majority	of	the	surveyed	investors	indicate	that	they	have	an	investment	horizon	of	at	
least	 two	years	and	half	of	 the	 investors	 indicate	 that	 they	have	a	horizon	of	more	 than	 five	
years.	 Pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 find	 long-term	 oriented	 goals	 more	 important	 than	
investment	funds.	While	all	investor	groups	consider	financial	returns	to	be	important	for	long-
term	 value	 creation,	 pension	 funds	 and	 insurers	 rank	 social	 and	 environmental	 factors	
significantly	higher	than	investment	funds.	
Most	 investors	 argue	 that	 long-term	 value	 creation	 can	 only	 be	 realised	 by	 investing	 in	 and	
engaging	with	companies	that	are	capable	of	adding	value	over	the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	
positive	or	at	 least	a	 less	negative	effect	on	society.	 Investors	want	 to	contribute	 to	 financial	
stability	and	add	value	to	the	real	economy.	A	very	important	concept	here	is	“stakeholders”:	a	
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company	cannot	create	value	over	the	long-term	if	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	interests	of	
all	stakeholders	versus	shareholders	only.	
The	survey	shows	that	all	 investor	groups	are	primarily	motivated	by	their	beneficiaries	(asset	
owners	 or	 clients)	 to	 pursue	 long-term	 value	 creation.	 Another	 important	 motive	 is	 the	
investment	belief	 that	 long-term	value	creation	has	a	positive	 impact	on	shareholder	returns.	
Stakeholder	 oriented	 investors	 feel	 it	 is	 their	 obligation	 to	 society	 and	 invest	 significant	
resources	in	measuring	the	benefits	of	long-term	value	creation.	
It	 is	 easier	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	 creation	 for	 concentrated	portfolios	 rather	 than	 (large)	
diversified	portfolios.	Moreover,	a	 long	 investment	chain	complicates	alignment	on	 long-term	
value	 creation,	 while	 family	 offices	 with	 concentrated	 investments	 and	 a	 long-term	 vision	
(without	 frequent	performance	benchmarking)	are	able	 to	engage	effectively	with	companies	
on	long-term	value	creation.	
A	key	barrier	to	long-term	value	creation	is	periodic	benchmarking.	This	is	particularly	prevalent	
among	investment	funds,	short-term	investors	and	financially	oriented	investors.	The	fact	that	
investors	follow	a	benchmark	indicates	they	are	not	consciously	selecting	companies	for	which	
they	believe	that	they	will	add	value	over	the	long	run.	Also	pension	fund	mandates	for	asset	
managers	 are	 sometimes	 based	 on	minimising	 the	 tracking	 error	with	 a	 leading	 benchmark,	
while	 pension	 fund	 owners	 themselves	 use	 a	 time	weighted	 return.	 Respondents’	 indication	
that	 they	 pursue	 long-term	 value	 creation	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 wide-	 spread	 practice	 of	
measuring	performance	against	a	market	return	benchmark.		
Another	 barrier	 is	 the	 traditional	 education	 of	 portfolio	 managers	 with	 a	 strong	 belief	 in	
markets,	 which	 can	 foster	 short-termism.	 Next,	 prudential	 supervision	 requires	 large	
institutional	 investors	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 certain	 risk	 profile,	 diversification	 requirements	 and	
financial	 risk	 management	 metrics	 and	 questions	 investors	 when	 there	 are	 deviations	 from	
benchmarks.	
Fiduciary	duty	 is	a	key	concept.	 International	 investors	 indicate	that	Dutch	clients	 (more	than	
clients	in	other	markets)	hold	them	accountable	on	ESG	factors.	
	
Engagement	
Inadequate	 corporate	 governance	 is	 an	 important	 trigger	 for	 shareholder	 engagement	 for	 all	
investor	 groups.	 For	 investment	 funds,	 the	 most	 important	 trigger	 to	 become	 active	 is	
underperformance	of	a	company.	 In	contrast,	 socially	 irresponsible	corporate	behaviour	 is	an	
important	trigger	for	pension	funds	and	insurers	and	stakeholder	oriented	investors.	
Engagement	 is	 the	 preferred	 strategy	 for	 all	 investor	 groups.	 Most	 investors	 indicate	 that	
(continuous)	 dialogues	 with	 portfolio	 companies	 are	most	 important.	 They	 rather	 engage	 in	
private	(behind	the	scenes)	than	in	public.	
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For	most	large	funds,	the	corporate	governance	specialists	decide	on	the	engagement	policies,	
whereas	 the	 portfolio	 managers	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 investment	 decisions	 and	 actual	
engagement.	This	can	lead	to	situations	in	which	no	integrated	decisions	are	made.	
All	 investors	 indicate	 they	make	use	of	 collective	engagement	 (with	other	 investors),	 as	 they	
believe	this	enables	them	to	have	a	stronger	voice.	Of	critical	 importance	here	are	regulatory	
considerations	 (e.g.	 acting	 in	 concert	 rules)	 and	 finding	 investors	 that	 are	 like-minded.	
Collective	engagement	and	collaboration	only	work	if	investors	have	similar	investment	beliefs.	
All	investors	indicate	that	they	make	extensive	use	of	Eumedion	(and	equivalent	bodies	in	other	
countries)	to	communicate	with	other	investors.	
	
4.2 Approach	and	limitations	
The	 blockholder	 data	 obtained	 from	WFT	 notifications	 offers	 a	 reasonable	 overview	 of	 the	
shares	of	5%	and	above	and	since	2013	also	for	stakes	in	the	3-5%	range.	However,	due	to	the	
absence	 of	 periodic	 confirmations	 of	 the	 ownership	 information,	 the	 data	 may	 include	
inaccuracies.	
While	the	survey	provides	the	opportunity	to	quantitatively	analyse	data,	 it	 is	very	difficult	to	
extend	the	findings	to	“all	blockholders”	of	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies.	As	explained	 in	
Chapter	3,	the	respondent	group	is	biased	towards	the	more	 long-term	investors,	which	have	
their	headquarters	in	the	Netherlands.	Besides	the	targeting	of	participants	via	Eumedion	and	
DUFAS,	 another	 cause	 for	 the	overrepresentation	of	 these	 investors	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	
more	interested	in	and	inclined	to	participate	in	a	survey	on	this	particular	topic.	Hedge	funds,	
which	are	more	short-term	oriented	and	activist	shareholders,	are	not	included	in	our	survey.	
This	leads	to	a	selection	bias.	
Next,	participants	may	be	concerned	with	confidentiality	and	anonymity	of	their	responses.	In	
surveying	the	opinion	of	large	shareholders,	they	may	also	be	inclined	to	answer	in	a	strategic	
or	untruthful	way.	In	particular,	if	the	survey	is	completed	by	corporate	governance	specialist,	
one	faces	the	risk	of	obtaining	politically	correct	answers	on	how	the	investors	wants	its	policy	
to	look	like,	rather	than	the	actual	investment	decisions	that	are	taken	by	portfolio	managers.	
In	order	 to	partially	overcome	these	 limitations,	communication	towards	participants	on	how	
the	data	is	handled	and	the	importance	of	confidentiality	is	very	clearly	and	repeatedly	stated	
and	participants	have	received	an	official	letter	from	the	Monitoring	Committee	enclosed	in	the	
e-mail	 invitation	 for	 the	 survey.	 Furthermore,	 the	 survey	 specifies	 that	 the	 research	 is	
conducted	from	a	portfolio	investment	perspective	and	invites	the	Chief	Investment	Officer	or	
another	Board	Member	 to	 complete	 the	 survey	and	 in	 the	 face-to-face	 interviews,	questions	
are	asked	from	an	asset	management	perspective.	
Finally,	 large	 shareholders	 operate	 in	 complex	 social	 systems	 consisting	 of	 many	 different	
stakeholders	whose	interests	need	to	be	balanced.	Therefore	it	is	difficult	to	identify	the	‘view’	
of	the	shareholder	and	the	important	factors	precisely.	
	 43	
	
4.3 Conditions	for	long-term	value	creation	
From	 our	 study,	 we	 distil	 several	 conditions	 for	 investors	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 pursue	 an	
investment	 strategy	 aimed	 at	 long-term	 value	 creation.	 Investors	 can	 realise	 long-term	
investment	 returns	 by	 investing	 in	 and	 engaging	with	 companies	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 adding	
value	over	the	long-term,	thereby	having	a	positive	effect	on	the	value	of	their	portfolios	and	
on	society.	
A	 first	 condition	 is	an	 intended	buy-and-hold	approach	with	a	 typical	holding	period	of	more	
than	 five	 years.	 This	 stimulates	 acting	 as	 a	 steward	 of	 the	 company.	 The	 description	 of	 the	
blockholding	data	of	Dutch	firms	demonstrates	that	blockholders	–	with	stakes	of	5%	or	more	–	
are	long-term	shareholders.	
A	second	condition	is	an	active	investment	strategy,	with	a	concentrated	portfolio.	This	active	
investment	strategy	is	often	based	on	fundamental	analysis	of	the	invested	companies.		
A	 third	 condition	 is	 effective	 engagement	 with	 invested	 companies	 on	 the	 long-term,	 both	
behind	 the	 scenes	 by	meeting	with	 companies	 and	 in	 the	 annual	 general	meeting	by	 voting.	
This	requires	human	resources,	expertise	and	time.		
A	 fourth	 condition	 is	 performance	 analysis	 based	 on	 companies’	 value-added	 in	 the	 real	
economy	 (both	 financial	 and	 societal	 value).	By	 contrast,	 a	passive	benchmark	 strategy	 (with	
minimum	tracking	error)	does	not	allow	(large)	deviations	from	the	market	benchmark.	It	is	also	
difficult	to	have	sufficient	knowledge	about,	and	really	engage	with,	multiple	companies	in	the	
benchmark	portfolio.	
A	 fifth	 condition	 is	 alignment	 of	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 asset	 owner	 or	 client	 and	 the	 asset	
manager.	 Our	 survey	 indicates	 that	 asset	 managers	 are	 primarily	 motivated	 by	 their	
beneficiaries	 (asset	owners	or	clients)	 to	pursue	 long-term	value	creation.	Another	 important	
motive	 is	 the	 investment	 belief	 that	 long-term	 value	 creation	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	
shareholder	returns.	
A	sixth	condition	is	to	keep	the	investment	chain	(between	parties	and	within	parties)	as	short	
as	possible,	as	each	player	in	the	investment	chain	may	hold	the	next	player	accountable	to	a	
shorter	period.		
Figure	4.1	illustrates	the	alignment	in	the	investment	chain	on	long-term	value	creation	(FCLT,	
2015).	The	asset	owner	provides	a	long-term	mandate	to	the	asset	manager	and	commits	to	a	
long-term	horizon.	The	asset	manager	has	an	active	ownership	stake	(as	part	of	a	concentrated	
portfolio)	and	engages	with	companies	on	the	long	term.	
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Figure	4.1:	Alignment	in	the	investment	chain	on	LTVC	
	
	 	
	
Source:	Adapted	from	FCLT	(2015)	
	
	
4.4 Recommendations	
Based	on	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 report,	we	make	 the	 following	 recommendations	 to	 strengthen	
long-term	value	creation:	
1. The	data	on	block	holdings	of	Dutch	firms	may	be	incomplete.	The	data	quality	can	be	
improved	by	periodic	updates	of	shareholdings	by	blockholders.	
2. Because	the	concentration	of	blockholdings	in	Dutch	firms	shows	a	negative	correlation	
with	 take-over	defenses,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	 the	debate	 about	 the	
protection	of	exchange-listed	firms	against	hostile	takeovers	that	these	protectons	are	
most	relevant	for	firms	with	fewer	blockholders.	
3. To	pursue	 long-term	value	creation,	 it	 is	 important	 that	asset	owners,	asset	managers	
and	 companies	 are	 aligned	 on	 a	 long-term	mandate,	 which	 includes	 ESG	 factors	 and	
allows	 asset	 managers	 to	 take	 larger	 stakes	 and	 thus	 deviate	 from	 market-based	
benchmarks.	
4. Investors	should	work	alongside	other	stakeholders,	as	companies	can	only	create	value	
over	the	long-term	if	they	take	into	account	the	interests	of	all	stakeholders.	
5. Investors	 should	 have	 sufficient	 human	 resources	 and	 expertise	 to	 engage	 with	
companies	on	the	long-term.	Long-term	investors	could	be	incentivised	through	loyalty	
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shares,	which	provide	an	additional	reward	to	shareholders	if	they	have	held	on	to	their	
shares	during	a	so-called	loyalty	period	(three,	five	or	ten	years).7	
6. New	 investment	 approaches	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 differently	 educating	 (young)	
finance	professionals	on	new	 investment	beliefs,	which	 includes	ESG-factors	and	 long-
term	thinking.	
7. The	prudential	supervisor	should	avoid	encouraging	institutional	investors	to	follow	the	
market	benchmark	and	allow	active	long-term	portfolio	strategies.	
8. Institutional	 investors	 should	 promote	 internal	 cooperation	 between	 the	 governance	
teams	and	the	portfolio	managers	and	ensure	a	single	voice	on	engagement.	
	
	 	
																																								 																				
7	 At	 the	 implementation,	 the	 lessons	 learned	 from	 current	 practices	 (e.g.	 loyalty	 shares	 given	 to	 the	
founder	 or	 controlling	 shareholder)	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 so	 that	 large	 shareholders	 feel	
comfortable	to	be	eligible	for	loyalty	shares.	Moreover,	there	should	be	no	need	to	register	shares	to	be	
eligible	for	loyalty	shares.	
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Appendix	-	Survey		
	
	
	
Large	Shareholders	in	Dutch	Exchange-listed	Companies	
	
Intro	
The	Dutch	Corporate	Governance	Code	Monitoring	Committee	monitors	compliance	of	Dutch	listed	
companies	and	institutional	investors	with	the	Dutch	Corporate	Governance	Code.	The	Committee	also	
ensures	that	the	Corporate	Governance	Code	is	practicable	and	up-to-date.	This	survey	is	conducted	by	
the	Rotterdam	School	of	Management	of	the	Erasmus	University	and	seeks	to	assess	the	motives	of	
large	shareholders	in	Dutch	exchange-listed	companies.	The	survey	is	executed	from	a	portfolio	
investment	perspective,	therefore	we	invite	the	CIO	or	another	board	member	to	complete	the	survey.	
We	take	the	confidentiality	of	your	responses	very	seriously.	Rotterdam	School	of	Management	will	not	
share	your	responses	with	anyone,	nor	will	individual	firms	or	respondents	be	identified.	If	you	would	
like	to	comment	on	any	question	in	the	survey,	please	do	so	at	the	dedicated	space	at	the	end	of	the	
survey.	
End	of	Block	
Investor	Characteristics	
	
Q1	What	is	your	position	or	job	title?	
o Chief	Investment	Officer	(1)		
o Board	Member	(2)		
o Portfolio	Manager	(3)		
o Corporate	Governance	or	Proxy	Voting	Specialist	(4)		
o Other,	please	specify:	(5)	________________________________________________	
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Q2	What	type	of	shareholder	is	your	institution?	
o Pension	Fund	(1)		
o Pension	Fund	-	Asset	Manager	(2)		
o Mutual	/	Investment	Fund	(3)		
o Bank	(4)		
o Hedge	Fund	(5)		
o Insurance	Company	(6)		
o Other	Financial	Institution	(7)		
o Other,	please	specify:	(8)	________________________________________________	
	
	
Q3	Please	indicate	the	value	of	your	institution’s	total	Assets	Under	Management	
o Less	than	€100	million	(1)		
o Between	€100	million	and	€1	billion	(2)		
o Between	€1	billion	and	€40	billion	(3)		
o Between	€40	billion	and	€100	billion	(4)		
o Between	€100	billion	and	€400	billion	(5)		
o More	than	€400	billion	(6)		
	
	
Q4	What	fraction	of	your	equity	portfolio	is	invested	in	the	Netherlands?	Please	answer	in	percentage	points	
________________________________________________________________	
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Q5	In	what	country	are	your	headquarters	based?	
o The	Netherlands	(1)		
o United	States	(US)	(2)		
o United	Kingdom	(UK)	(3)		
o Rest	of	Continental	Europe	(4)		
o Rest	of	the	World	(5)		
	
End	of	Block	
Investment	Characteristics	
	
Q6	What	is	the	typical	holding	period	for	investments	in	your	portfolio,	on	average?	
o Very	short	(less	than	1	week)	(1)		
o Short	(less	than	6	months)	(2)		
o Medium	(6	to	12	months)	(3)		
o Long	(more	than	2	years)	(4)		
o Very	long	(more	than	5	years)	(5)		
	
	
Q7	Please	indicate	what	percentage	(0-100%)	of	share	capital	your	institution	invests	under	the	following	
investment	strategies:	
An	active,	concentrated	investment	strategy	:	_______		(1)	
An	active,	diversified	portfolio	strategy	:	_______		(2)	
An	active,	diversified	strategy	via	quantitative	/	fundamental	analysis	:	_______		(3)	
A	passive	(buy	&	hold)	strategy,	but	actively	monitored	:	_______		(4)	
A	passive	(buy	&	hold)	strategy	but	not	actively	monitored	:	_______		(5)	
Total	:	________		
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Q8	Please	indicate	your	opinion	with	regards	to	the	following	statement:	“In	setting	my	investment	strategy,	I	
believe	the	ideal	investment	horizon	is	more	than	2-4	years”.		
o Strongly	agree	(1)		
o Somewhat	agree	(2)		
o Neither	agree	nor	disagree	(3)		
o Somewhat	disagree	(4)		
o Strongly	disagree	(5)		
	
	
Q9	When	you	consider	buying	or	selling	shares,	how	important	is	the	liquidity	of	the	shares?		
o Extremely	important	(1)		
o Very	important	(2)		
o Moderately	important	(3)		
o Slightly	important	(4)		
o Not	at	all	important	(5)		
	
	
Q10	Within	how	many	exchange-listed	Dutch	corporations	is	your	fund	a	blockholder?	(A	blockholder	has	an	
equity	ownership	stake	of	>5%	within	the	corporation).	
________________________________________________________________	
	
End	of	Block	
Investment	Assessment	
	
Q11	What	metrics	do	you	use	to	review	the	performance	of	your	investments?		
________________________________________________________________	
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________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Q12	How	long	is	the	period	of	time	over	which	you	conduct	performance	reviews	of	your	investments?	Please	
answer	in	number	of	months.		
________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Q13	To	what	extent	are	the	following	goals	important	for	your	fund?		
	 Extremely	important	(1)	
Very	
important	(2)	
Moderately	
important	(3)	
Slightly	
important	(4)	
Not	at	all	
important	(5)	
Making	strong	financial	
returns	(1)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Environmental	impact	
(e.g.	climate	change	and	
biodiversity	loss)	(2)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Outperforming	
benchmarks	(3)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Social	(e.g.	to	prevent	
child	labor,	encourage	
equality,	ensure	human	
rights)	(4)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Play	a	stewardship	role	
in	support	of	longer-
term	corporate	
strategies	(5)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Interests	of	employees	
(6)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Good	governance	(7)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
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Q14a	To	what	extent	do	you	feel	pressured	to	demonstrate	strong	financial	performance	over	a	period	of	2	years	
or	less?		
o Extremely	pressured	(1)		
o Pressured	(2)		
o Slightly	pressured	(3)		
o Neither	pressured	nor	unpressured	(4)		
o Not	at	all	pressured	(5)		
	
	
Q14b	Where	does	this	pressure	stem	from?	
o Board	of	Directors	(1)		
o Asset	Owners	(2)		
o Beneficiaries	of	the	Fund	(3)		
o Regulators	(4)		
o Others,	please	specify:	(5)	________________________________________________	
	
	
Q15	Does	your	fund	reject	investment	opportunities	if	they	involve	ESG	risks?		
o Yes	(1)		
o No	(2)		
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Q16	Please	indicate	to	what	extent	you	feel	your	institution	is	tolerant	towards	portfolio	companies	that	are	
experiencing	temporary	(financial	or	governance	related)	uncertainty?		
o Very	tolerant	(1)		
o Somewhat	tolerant	(2)		
o Neither	tolerant	nor	intolerant	(3)		
o Somewhat	intolerant	(4)		
o Very	intolerant	(5)		
	
	
Q17	Please	briefly	describe	your	definition	of	the	concept	of	long-term	value	creation		
________________________________________________________________	
________________________________________________________________	
	
End	of	Block	
Investment	Engagement	
	
Q18a	To	what	extent	do	you	as	an	investor	make	use	of	external	proxy	voting	advisors	when	determining	how	to	
vote	in	a	Dutch	annual	meeting	(AGM)?		
o Always	(1)		
o That	depends	on	the	company	(2)		
o That	depends	on	the	agenda	item	(3)		
o That	depends	on	the	circumstances	(4)		
o Never	(5)		
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Q18b	To	what	extent	is	the	advice	of	the	proxy	voting	firm	used?		
o Follow	advice	fully	(1)		
o Determine	own	position	by	taking	the	advice	into	account	(2)		
o Only	take	into	account	the	advise	in	case	of	own	doubts	(3)		
o Other,	please	specify:	(4)	________________________________________________	
	
	
Q18c	What	advisor	do	you	use?	
________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Q18d	What	fraction	of	your	shares	do	you	hold	back	during	the	Annual	General	Meeting	(AGM)	to	sell	or	short	
sell?	Please	answer	in	percentage	points	
________________________________________________________________	
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Q19	What	measures	of	shareholder	engagement	have	you	taken	in	the	past	five	years	with	any	of	your	portfolio	
companies?	Choose	all	that	apply	
  None	(1)		
  Selling	shares	because	of	dissatisfaction	with	performance	(2)		
  Selling	shares	because	of	dissatisfaction	with	corporate	governance	practices	(3)		
  Voting	against	management	at	the	annual	meeting	(AGM)	(4)		
  Selling	shares	because	of	dissatisfaction	with	corporate	social	or	environmental	practices	(5)		
  Publicly	criticizing	management	in	the	media	(6)		
  Legal	action	against	management	(e.g.	file	a	lawsuit,	participate	in	a	class	action)	(7)		
  Submitting	shareholder	proposals	for	the	proxy	statement	(8)		
  Discussions	with	members	of	the	Board	of	Directors	outside	of	Management	(9)		
  Discussion	with	top	management	(10)		
  Criticizing	management	and	the	board	at	the	annual	meeting	(AGM)	(11)		
  Publicizing	a	dissenting	vote	(12)		
  Writing	a	letter	to	management	(13)		
  Aggressively	questioning	management	in	a	conference	call	(14)		
  Proposing	specific	actions	to	management	(e.g.,	sell	assets,	fire	the	CEO,	stop	equity	offering)	Please	
indicate	the	proposed	action:	(15)		
  Other,	please	specify:	(16)	________________________________________________	
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Q20	Which	of	the	following	strategies	is	preferred	by	your	fund?	Choose	only	one	option.		
o Exclusion	(1)		
o Inclusion	(2)		
o Engagement	(3)		
o Confrontation	(4)		
o Best-in-Class	Approach	(5)		
o Combination	of	the	above	strategies	(6)		
o None	of	the	above	(7)		
	
	
Q21a	Do	you	believe	that	the	threat	of	selling	shares,	rather	than	exit	itself,	is	an	effective	disciplining	mechanism	
for	management?	
o Yes	(1)		
o No	(2)		
	
	
Q21b	What	is	the	minimum	stake	size	a	fund	needs	to	have	for	it	to	be	effective?	
o Doesn't	matter	(1)		
o At	least	0.5%	(2)		
o At	least	2%	(3)		
o At	least	5%	(4)		
o At	least	10%	(5)		
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Q22	In	order	to	identify	characteristics	of	portfolio	companies	that	are	usually	targeted	for	activism	by	your	
institution,	please	indicate	the	degree	to	which	you	agree	with	the	following	statements	as	they	apply	to	your	
institution.	We	tend	to	become	more	active...	
	 Strongly	agree	(1)	
Somewhat	
agree	(2)	
Neither	agree	
nor	disagree	
(3)	
Somewhat	
disagree	(4)	
Strongly	
disagree	(5)	
...with	companies	that	
are	experiencing	
Corporate	Governance	
issues	(1)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...when	we	hold	a	larger	
percentage	of	total	
outstanding	voting	
rights	of	the	target	
company	(2)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...when	we	know	that	
other	investors	are	also	
active	in	the	target	
company	(3)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...when	the	level	of	
insider	ownership	in	the	
target	company	is	
higher	(4)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...when	the	level	of	
institutional	ownership	
in	the	target	company	is	
higher	(5)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...when	our	investment	
in	the	target	company	is	
relatively	large	to	our	
total	investment	(6)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...on	the	shares	of	
companies	we		know	
well	(7)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
...on	the	shares	of	
companies	with	whom	
we	do	not	have	close	
business	ties	(8)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
…with	companies	that	
are	under	performing	
(9)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
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Q23	Which	of	the	following	corporate	governance	events	or	policies	do	you	view	as	the	top	four	triggers	for	
shareholder	engagement?	(Please	rank	#1,	#2,	#3,	#4)	
______	Poor	absolute	financial	performance	(1)	
______	Poor	corporate	strategy	(2)	
______	Excessive	management	compensation	(3)	
______	Earnings	restatement	(4)	
______	Large	negative	earnings	surprise	(5)	
______	Low	payments	to	shareholders	despite	high	cash	holdings	(6)	
______	Inadequate	corporate	governance	(7)	
______	Uncooperative	management	(8)	
______	Poor	financial	performance	relative	to	peers	(9)	
______	Large	equity	issuance	(10)	
______	Large	diversifying	merger	or	acquisition	(11)	
______	Suboptimal	capital	structure	(12)	
______	The	threat	of	major	shareholders	to	sell	shares	(13)	
______	Corporate	fraud	(14)	
______	Socially	“irresponsible”	corporate	behavior	(e.g.	human	rights	violations	or	pollution)	(15)	
______	Other,	please	specify	(16)	
	
	
Q24a	Please	provide	your	opinion	on	the	following	legal	arrangements	that	Dutch	firms	may	have	
	 We	would	not	invest	(1)	 We	are	indifferent	(2)	 We	would	be	more	likely	to	invest	(3)	
Binding	nomination	(1)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Anti-takeover	preferred	
shares	(2)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Certificates	(3)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Priority	shares	(4)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Loyalty	voting	rights	(5)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Pyramid	structure	(6)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
Dual-class	shares	(7)		 o 	 o 	 o 	
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Q24b	Give	your	view	on	the	legal	arrangements	in	the	previous	question.	Do	these	arrangements	enhance	a	long-
term	value	perspective?	
________________________________________________________________	
________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Q25a	Does	your	institution	care	about	long-term	value	creation?	
o Yes	(1)		
o No	(2)		
	
	
Q25b	This	question	relates	to	the	reasons	why	your	institution	decides	to	pursue	a	strategy	of	long-term	value	
creation.	Please	indicate	to	what	extent	you	agree	with	the	following	statements.	
	
	 Strongly	agree	(1)	
Somewhat	
agree	(2)	
Neither	
agree	nor	
disagree	(3)	
Somewhat	
disagree	(4)	
Strongly	
disagree	(5)	
Our	decisions	to	pursue	long-
term	value	creation	are	based	
on	a	thorough	cost-benefit	
analysis	(1)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	know	that	long-term	value	
creation	has	a	positive	
relationship	with	shareholder	
returns	(2)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
The	activities	of	other	
institutional	investors	
influence	our	activities	as	a	
shareholder	(3)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	feel	that	our	primary	
beneficiaries	want	us	to	
pursue	long-term	value	
creation	(4)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	invest	significant	resources	
in	measuring	the	benefits	of	
pursuing	a	long-term	strategy	
(5)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
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The	new	Corporate	
Governance	Code	or	societal	
associations	(NGOs)	prompt	us	
to	pursue	a	long-term	value	
creation	strategy	(6)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
A	long-term	value	creation	
strategy	is	our	insurance	
against	uncertainty	(7)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	assume	but	have	no	proof	
that	long-term	value	creation	
has	a	positive	relationship	
with	total	shareholder	returns	
(8)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	feel	pressures	from	our	
stakeholders	to	pursue	a	long-
term	value	creation	strategy	
(9)		
o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
We	feel	it	is	our	obligation	to	
society	to	pursue	long	term-
value	creation	(10)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
Professional	networks	inspire	
us	to	engage	in	long-term	
value	creation	(11)		 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	
End	of	Block	
Closing	Questions	
	
	In	case	you	would	be	interested	in	receiving	the	results	of	this	survey,	please	fill	in	your	e-mail.	
________________________________________________________________	
	
	
Were	any	of	the	questions	unclear	or	do	you	have	any	other	suggestions	or	remarks?	
________________________________________________________________	
________________________________________________________________	
End	of	Block	
End	of	survey	–	Thank	you	very	much	for	your	participation		
